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Preface
The AICPA (www.aicpa.org) is the national professional association of CPAs with more than
329,000 members in public practice, business and industry, government, and education. The
AICPA is the first national, professional membership association to be ISO 9001 certified, in
recognition of its quality management and assurance practices.

The AICPA believes the long-term viability of the Social Security system must be addressed.
Other societal, economic, and workforce changes over the last decade also call into question the
role, design, and objectives of the program over the next century. Unfortunately, it is often
difficult to understand the degree of the financial problem and the nature of the other issues
because the facts are buried in political rhetoric. The goal of this study is to provide unbiased
facts and analysis to the reader and to foster informed discussion. It will be through such
discussion that creative and fair solutions will be found.
Much has changed in the more than fifty years since the Social Security system was created. The
demographics of the individuals contributing to and receiving benefits from the system have
altered considerably. The social structure and wage-earner roles of the American family are very
different. The system is older and faces the issues inherent in a mature pay-as-you-go system.

Other factors have not changed. Social Security continues to keep many elderly Americans out of
poverty. All Americans continue to expect, and many rely upon, the promised benefits for their
contributions into the system. Hence, the reform debate must consider all these issues as it
reexamines the role of Social Security in the American tax and social support system.

The debate surrounding Social Security reform also brings to the forefront philosophical
differences, varying opinions about impact, and the age-old trade-offs between fairness,
simplicity, economic growth, and social policy. Options for reform have a far-reaching effect on
all Americans. Current and future beneficiaries must understand the implications of reform in
order to reach a consensus and to gain broad acceptance of a new system.

Before anyone takes a position on the “right” solution for Social Security reform, the AICPA
strongly urges that policymakers and the public have a clear understanding of the facts and issues
surrounding reform. However, the debate, a solution, and plans for a reasonable transition must
be developed in the near (rather than the distant) future. The longer we delay, and the longer the
financial issues go unsolved, the more difficult and painful the solution becomes.
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Executive Summary
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SECURITY:
THE ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION
The United States is about to engage in a major debate about Social Security reform. The
primary reason for this debate is the consensus view from the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and from private experts that Social Security will not have sufficient resources to fund
“promised” retirement benefits in the not-too-distant future.
According to official estimates, the Social Security system will start spending more than it
collects income in a little over two decades. A decade after that, all the trust fund’s assets will be
depleted. With no trust fund assets, taxes will be the only source of revenue for benefits. Social
Security will then be able to fund only about three-quarters of its benefit obligations. These
sobering forecasts are a far cry from the rosy scenarios that accompanied Social Security reforms
enacted in 1983.

Some analysts consider Social Security unfair because many workers will be getting belowmarket rates of return from their “investment” in Social Security. Even if the Social Security
system were somehow able to meet all of its obligations, future Social Security beneficiaries will
not receive as good a deal as did their parents.
Some analysts believe that because Social Security has enough projected cash flow and assets to
fund benefits for over thirty years, there is no reason to modify Social Security at this time.
These analysts stress the uncertainty of projections and prefer a “pay-as-you-go” approach.

Other analysts believe that Social Security should be fully funded over the long term but do not
wish to modify the fundamental structure of the system. Proponents of this approach generally
advocate a package of changes to Social Security that include a combination of tax increases,
benefit cuts, and increased returns on trust fund investments.
Still other analysts wish not only to fully fund Social Security but to also address problems of
economic growth and fairness. In general, these analysts favor what is generally referred to as
“privatization”—a system of mandatory retirement accounts in which individuals could choose
to invest in the stock market and other private investments.
This AICPA Executive Summary and the underlying study, Understanding Social Security: The
Issues and Alternatives, are designed to help all interested Americans begin to understand how
Social Security reforms will affect the economy as well as the finances of their parents,
themselves, and their children.

xiii

THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Overview
According to best estimates of the SSA, the Social Security trust fund balance (collections in
excess of payments) will peak in the year 2012. Thereafter, it will steadily decline until it is fully
exhausted (payments will exceed collections) in 2032. This does not mean that no funds will be
available to pay benefits. After the trust fund is depleted, payroll tax receipts would be able to
support approximately three-quarters of all currently promised benefit payments.
Demographics

The deteriorating financial condition of Social Security is due to a host of factors, but the main
cause is related to demographics. Americans are living longer. Life expectancy at birth is fifteen
years longer in 1995 than it was in 1935. Longer life expectancy means longer retirements, and
that means that Social Security is obligated to pay more lifetime retirement benefits. At the same
time, there has been a long-term decline in the birth rate. In 1957, at the height of the postwar
baby boom, women on average had three and one-half children during their lifetime. Currently,
the birthrate is approximately two children per woman. Fewer births mean there are fewer
younger workers to contribute to the system.
The statistic that best summarizes the financial plight of Social Security is the decline in the ratio
of beneficiaries to workers. In 1960, the worker-to-beneficiary ratio was 8.6. Currently, it is 3.3.
It is projected to be 2.2 in 2025.

How Good Are the Estimates?

The SSA itself recognizes the high degree of uncertainty surrounding its estimates of the long
term actuarial balance of the Social Security trust fund. To put some bounds on this uncertainty,
the SSA routinely publishes two alternative sets of estimates in addition to the intermediate-cost
estimate most often quoted in the press and by policymakers. The high-cost estimate sets all
demographic and economic assumptions to their most pessimistic (from a financing point of
view) level within a reasonable range. Conversely, the low-cost estimate sets all variables to their
most optimistic level.
Under high-cost projections, the Social Security trust fund balance peaks in 2006 and then
payments exceed collections by 2022. Under low-cost projections, however, the Social Security
trust fund is sufficient to meet all currently promised obligations and payments never exceed
collections.

There is not much dispute about the SSA’s projections. Demographers and economists generally
agree that there are no significant biases in the SSA’s estimates. There is, however, significant
disagreement about how to characterize the Social Security system’s situation. In general, those
who wish to preserve the basic structure of the current Social Security system are inclined to
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characterize the current fiscal imbalance as small and manageable. In contrast, proponents of
more dramatic changes in Social Security—in particular, advocates of privatization—are more
likely to characterize the current fiscal imbalance as a financial crisis.
One thing is for sure: With each passing year, the Social Security trust fund becomes more
financially unsound. The ratio of receipts to benefits is declining over time. As the seventy-fiveyear projection period window moves forward in time, it includes fewer surplus years (at the
beginning of the period) and more deficit years (at the end of the period). Consequently, the
longer Congress and the President wait to reform Social Security, the more severe the benefit
cuts, tax increases, or both will be in order to correct the problem. The sooner the action, the less
painful the solution.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND POVERTY
For the vast majority of America’s elderly, the Social Security system has become the central
component of their retirement security. It is for low-income elderly that Social Security is
particularly important. For the 40 percent of America’s elderly with the lowest incomes, Social
Security accounts for more than three-quarters of their total income in retirement.
The elderly poverty rate has declined dramatically since Social Security benefits have become
more pervasive. The elderly poverty rate in 1959 was 35.2 percent—more than double the 17.0
percent that applied to non-elderly adults. The poverty rate for the elderly has since declined by
more than two-thirds. The elderly poverty rate in 1996 was 10.8 percent—actually lower than
that for other adults. If Social Security benefits were not available, and there were no other
changes in the economy or government programs, the poverty rate among the elderly would be
54 percent.

Despite the tremendous reduction in elderly poverty over time, serious pockets of poverty
continue to exist for the elderly—particularly among widows, the very old, and minorities. Older
women are twice as likely as men to be in poverty. For both African-Americans and Hispanic
Americans, the elderly poverty hovers at approximately 25 percent—about two and a half times
larger than that for white Americans.

Any plan to reform Social Security must give serious consideration to its impacts on the riskiness
and size of benefits paid to the elderly poor and those elderly near the poverty line. In addition,
any reduction in the benefits paid to low- and moderate-income elderly could place additional
financial burdens on all levels of government as well as charitable organizations that help the
elderly poor.
SOCIAL SECURITY AS AN INVESTMENT

About 90 percent of current retirees receive a monthly check from Social Security for an average
amount of approximately $750. Most of these beneficiaries are receiving more than their
actuarially fair share of benefits. In other words, they receive a return on their Social Security
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contributions that is greater than they would have received if they had invested that money in the
private markets.

Unfortunately, the returns on investment from Social Security for future retirees will be much
lower than now or in the past. For example, a one-earner couple that retired in 1980 generated
benefits equivalent to a 7.7 percent (inflation-adjusted) return. The same couple retiring in 2010
will earn a 3.6 percent return.

Furthermore, many future retirees will earn below-market returns—even assuming all promised
benefits can be paid. It is not clear how the average rate of return on Social Security can
significantly improve as long as the trust fund is restricted to investments in U.S. government
securities.

Besides differences in returns across generations, there are substantial differences in returns
within generations. Under Social Security, married couples generally do better than single
individuals—primarily because of the availability of spousal and survivor benefits. Even as rates
of return are expected to decline rapidly in the future, one-earner couples are expected to
continue to receive a very “good deal” from Social Security.
Among single individuals, females in general generate larger returns than males because of their
longer life expectancy. In general, Social Security provides much higher rates of return to lowincome households than to high-income households because the formula for determining benefits
gives greater weight for contributions at lower wages.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE ECONOMY
Effects on Labor Market

Analysts do not believe that Social Security taxes have had much impact on the overall supply of
labor in the U.S. economy. On the other hand, analysts do believe that Social Security has
adversely affected certain portions of the labor market. In particular, it seems likely that Social
Security benefit rules have resulted in earlier retirements and less work performed during
retirement.
Effects on Saving
In prior years—when the Social Security system was rapidly increasing benefits without
prefunding—it is likely that Social Security did have some negative impact on national savings.
Because individuals believed they could depend on Social Security, they did not save as much.
Because the government was depending on future taxes to pay these future benefits, the
government did not save either.

It is less clear what the current effect of Social Security is on national savings. Individuals no
longer believe they can depend on Social Security (and, in fact, they will receive lower
xvi

“investment returns” from Social Security). Consequently, individuals are much less likely now,
than in the past, to reduce saving because of the existence of Social Security.
Social Security could also improve saving if it prefunded benefits (accumulated current excess
assets to fund future promised benefits) and if the federal government did not use the current
Social Security surplus of collections over benefits to pay for current operating expenditures.
Unfortunately, both the current Administration and congressional leadership choose to hide the
size of the current federal budget deficit behind the Social Security surplus.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE STOCK MARKET
Overview

Current law requires that reserves of the Social Security trust fund be invested in interest-bearing
obligations of the federal government. Historically, the rate of return on government securities,
on average, is lower than the rate of return on private equities. Many reform proposals include
some prefunding of retirement benefits with a portfolio of assets that includes private equities.
Risk
Social Security trust fund investment in the stock market generates many questions about
riskiness of the underlying portfolio, reallocation of risk between government and beneficiaries,
and risk management. It is important to distinguish between risks to the overall financial
soundness of the system and risks faced by individuals in the system. Stocks are riskier than
government bonds. Even adjusting for risk, Social Security funds invested in private equities
would be expected to produce higher returns than if invested in government bonds. Risks faced
by individuals will be determined by whether there are also changes to benefits, whether the
program shifts from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution type plan, what the investment
guidelines are, and what the form of the investment is (investment by the trust fund, publicly
managed individual accounts, or privately managed individual accounts).

Administrative Costs
Cost of administration is an important factor in determining the net return of any pension plan.
Currently Social Security’s administrative costs are one-quarter of those of private pensions. In
proposed reform plans that have the Social Security trust fund investing in private equities or
have individual accounts administered by the SSA, administrative costs generally remain
comparable to those incurred under current law. Costs increase dramatically when individuals
hold accounts with private funds that allow a wide range of investment options.
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Impact on the Economy
Although investment in the stock market would improve the financial condition of the Social
Security trust fund, it is not likely to have an appreciable impact on the overall economy. It
would give a more accurate allocation of rate of return and saving throughout the economy.
However, it would also increase the government’s cost to borrow funds as Social Security
receipts invested in the stock market would no longer be available for below-market-rate
borrowing by the government.

PATHWAYS TO REFORM

Overview
There are three general methods of improving the financial condition of Social Security: (1)
reductions in benefits, (2) increases in revenues, and (3) increases to the rate of return on assets
used to prefund Social Security benefits. Because it seems the least painful, the third set of
options is attracting the most attention. Proposals to improve the return on Social Security assets
fall into two categories: (3a) plans that would involve only minor restructuring but would allow
the trust fund to invest in equities, and (3b) plans that would “privatize” the system through the
creation of new mandatory individual accounts, each of which could invest in equities.
Reductions in Benefits
Benefit Cuts

General cuts in benefits would improve the soundness of Social Security, but equal percentage
cuts for all retirees would push many retirees below the poverty level. Also, benefit cuts would
reduce individuals’ return on Social Security. For groups that currently enjoy above-average rates
of return—like the current elderly, married couples with one earner, and low-income
individuals—a benefit cut would bring Social Security down to levels comparable to other
investments. However, for others with below-average returns—like future single retirees and
future high-income retirees—any reduction in benefits would only exacerbate the problem of low
returns.
Raising the Retirement Age
Under current law, the normal retirement age is sixty-five and is scheduled to increase gradually
to age sixty-seven by the year 2022. Early retirement can occur at sixty-two years of age. Perhaps
the most commonly discussed methods of reducing benefits are an additional increase in the
normal retirement age and an increase in the early retirement age.
In many respects, increasing the retirement age has effects that are similar to benefit cuts: The
financial soundness of the system would improve at the cost of higher rates of poverty and lower
rates of return. There are some differences in the incidence of these burdens when benefits are
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cut by increasing retirement ages as opposed to across-the-board cuts: Those with shorter life
expectancies bear a larger share of the burden. For example, African-Americans generally have
higher early-death rates than do white Americans. Also, individuals who are less educated
generally have higher early-death rates than highly educated individuals.

Reducing Cost-of-Living Adjustments

There has been widespread criticism of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) used to adjust Social
Security benefits for increases in prices. Many analysts believe the CPI overstates increases in
the cost of living. There have been many proposals for both ad hoc and technical adjustments to
the CPI to correct this error. If reductions were made to the CPI as it is used to compute Social
Security benefits, this would be equivalent to a phased-in across-the-board reduction of
benefits—with an increasingly negative impact on the returns of future Social Security
beneficiaries.

Reducing Benefits for Individuals Receiving High Benefits
It is sometimes suggested that cutbacks in benefits be concentrated among beneficiaries with
high incomes. Perhaps the easiest method of cutting benefits to more affluent Americans is to
reduce monthly benefits only for individuals receiving high benefits. The problem with reducing
benefits in this manner is that some affluent Americans receive low benefits, and some with high
benefits have no other income. Although simple, this method is not especially well-targeted in
concentrating cutbacks among the affluent. In addition, the potential for adverse impacts on labor
supply is proportionately greater under this approach.

Means Testing of Benefits

Means testing is more precisely targeted than cutting back high benefits. This is achieved by
cutting benefits on the basis of family wealth or income—and not just benefit levels—when
assessing need. Most analysts agree that wealth is the best indicator of well-being—particularly
among the elderly—but that measuring wealth presents enormous conceptual and compliance
problems. Even means testing based on income would add substantial new compliance and
administrative costs to the currently simple Social Security system. However, the economic
problems caused by means testing are significant.
Taxing Social Security Benefits
Social Security benefits were not subject to tax until 1983. In 1993 their taxation was expanded.
Economically, the taxation of Social Security benefits is equivalent to means testing by income.
Given that high- and middle-income families are already taxed on their Social Security benefits,
any expanded taxation of Social Security benefits is likely to have its most adverse impact on
low- to moderate-income elderly.
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Increase Revenues

Increase the Payroll Tax Rate
A payroll tax rate increase improves the financial soundness of the Social Security system, but it
also reduces the net benefits of Social Security for current workers vis-a-vis current beneficiaries.
Low- and moderate-income workers may fall below the poverty line as a result of a payroll tax
increase (particularly since payroll taxes have no personal exemptions or standard deductions).

Increase the Limit on Taxable Earnings

Currently, an individual’s annual wages up to $68,400 are subject to Social Security payroll tax.
One way to increase Social Security revenue would be to eliminate this ceiling on taxable
earnings. Such an increase focuses the burden of new taxes on high-income individuals.
However, unlike means-testing benefits, new taxes put the greatest burden on the youngest highincome workers and entirely exempts current, high-income retirees. Many would consider this
particularly unfair given that future high-income beneficiaries—particularly single individuals
and two-earner couples—are already slated to receive the lowest rates of return on contributions
ever paid out by the Social Security system.

Use General Tax Revenues
Looking purely from within the Social Security system, use of general tax revenues to support
Social Security would improve finances, increase rates of return, and prevent erosion in the
popularity of the program. All these benefits are illusory, however, because they come at the
expense of tax increases or cuts in government spending not typically factored into measures of
Social Security’s performance. Furthermore, many believe use of general tax revenues would
erode political support for the program because the program would move away from being
perceived as a retirement plan and move closer to being perceived as a welfare plan.

Extend Social Security Coverage to State and Local Workers

Currently, some employees of state and local governments are not required to participate in
Social Security. Although the salaries paid by state and local governments are not subject to
Social Security tax, these workers may still be eligible for substantial benefits because their
spouses are participants. Requiring these workers to participate in the system would improve the
Social Security system’s finances.
Earn Higher Returns on Social Security Assets
Overview of Investment Issues

Most proposals for Social Security reform include prefunding retirement with a portfolio of
assets that includes investment in the stock market. Some proposals would remove current
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restrictions so that the trust fund could invest in the stock market. Other proposals would allow
(or require) individuals to invest their own retirement accounts which could include investment
in the stock market.

Over long periods of time, the return on investment in the stock market greatly outperforms the
return on U.S. government securities. The difference in returns is enormous. Historically, the
return on stocks on average has exceeded that of U.S. government securities by about five
percentage points. Stocks are riskier than bonds. Even after adjusting for risk, higher returns are
available on stocks than on bonds.
Although investment in the stock market would probably improve the financial condition of the
Social Security system, this change in policy would likely have little impact on the overall
economy.
Invest Trust Fund Assets in Private Capital Markets

Currently, the types of proposals that are receiving the most attention are those that would
“privatize” Social Security. Under these plans, workers would be required to contribute to
retirement accounts that the worker would own and control. The worker would have some
discretion about investment options and perhaps even payout options. This distinctly new
approach raises several questions:
•

To what degree, and over what period, would benefits under the existing system have to
remain in place? Some privatization plans leave much of the current system in place and
then tack on a relatively small additional contribution to fund new additional accounts.
Some privatization plans bifurcate the current system: While current benefits are honored,
all new contributions are used to fund new individual defined-contribution accounts. All
plans have transition periods that span decades.

•

Will there be any safety net for low-income beneficiaries? The current system redistributes
benefits from high-income to low-income individuals. Individual accounts—by their
nature—do not allow redistribution.

•

How much discretion will individuals have? Must individuals annuitize benefits, as occurs
currently, or can benefits be received in a lump sum or under some other method? With
respect to investment options, will individuals be able to select from a choice of index
funds (as under the Federal Employees Retirement System) or will individuals be able to
direct investments more specifically (as they would with a private investment account)?
This last question is particularly important because administrative costs are much higher for
any plans in which indexed funds are not used.

In general, any movement toward a plan including individual accounts will improve investment
returns on Social Security because of additional prefunding and the higher returns available from
private securities. Because individual accounts make Social Security contributions less like a tax,
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such a privatized system has more potential than other reform plans to increase economic
growth. In short, the move from the current system to a privatized system brings to the forefront
the age-old trade-off between economic growth and social welfare.

Summary Evaluation of Options for Reform
Soundness:
Improves
Condition of
Fund?

Money’s Worth:
Poverty:
Growth:
Impact on
Degree of
Growth:
Probable
Average Rate of Redistribution to Probable Impact Impact on Labor
Return?
Low Incomes?
on Saving?
Supply?

1. Reduce benefits
A. Across the board

Yes

Reduces

B. Only for high-wage workers

Yes

C. Increase retirement age

Yes

Less

More

More

Reduces

More

More

More

Reduces

Depends

More

More

II. Increase revenue

A. Raise payroll tax rate

Yes

Reduces

Depends

More

Less

B. Raise ceiling on taxable
earnings

Yes

Reduces

More

More

Less

Yes

Increases

No effect

No effect

No effect

No effect

Increases

Less

Increases

More

III. Improve return on assets
A. Invest trust fund in equities
B. Individual accounts
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Chapter 1
THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF SOCIAL SECURITY

SUMMARY
•

If no changes are made to the Social Security system, based on the Social Security
Administration’s best guess as to what the future holds, the Social Security trust fund
balance will peak in the year 2012. Thereafter, it will steadily decline as yearly benefit
payments exceed yearly collections, until annual payments exceed annual collections by 25
percent in 2032.

•

If these estimates stand, and no statutory changes are made in the Social Security system,
beneficiaries will receive full benefits through the year 2032. After that, there will be funds
sufficient to pay benefits at only about three-quarters of promised levels.

•

Special-issue debt instruments issued for Social Security trust fund surpluses currently
offset federal government deficits. If full benefits are to be paid after 2032, federal general
funds will need to begin to repay the borrowings of prior years. Repayment will likely
result in larger annual deficits.

•

An immediate and permanent increase in the Social Security tax rate from its current level
of 12.4 percent to 14.6 percent would eliminate this estimated shortfall.

•

Increased longevity and reduced birth rate are at the heart of Social Security’s long-term
financing problems. In 1960, the worker-to-beneficiary ratio was 8.6. Currently, it is 3.3. It
is projected to be 2.2 in the year 2025.

•

Although the Social Security Administration’s best-guess (intermediate) assumptions are
reasonable, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates. The possibilities
range from the high-cost projections, under which the Social Security trust fund reaches its
peak in 2006 and is entirely depleted by 2022, to the low-cost projections, under which the
Social Security trust fund is never depleted and there is no long-term financing problem.

INTRODUCTION

During its first half century of existence, the Social Security system was all things to all people.
To the American public generally, it had the appearance of a pension plan that yielded an
excellent return on contributions. To advocates of income redistribution, the Social Security
system provided a vehicle for substantially reducing poverty among the elderly without the
stigma of “welfare.” However, as first hinted by the Social Security reforms of 1983, it is now
abundantly clear that the glory days of the Social Security system are over. Under current
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projections, the Social Security system cannot meet all its future obligations. Even if it does,
future Social Security beneficiaries will not receive as favorable a return as their parents.1

The most salient financial characteristic of the Social Security system has been its “pay-as-yougo” structure. Throughout most of its history, the Social Security system has not prefunded
benefits and has used “excess” receipts to finance other government expenditures. Even now,
with a significant buildup in trust fund assets, benefits are only partially funded. The result is a
massive intergenerational redistribution of wealth from the young to the elderly. Through Social
Security, today’s workers are funding a large part of their parents’ retirement, but their children
will not be able to do the same for them. Most projections indicate that not all promised
retirement benefits can be paid to today’s workers under the current financing arrangements. All
projections indicate that current workers will get a much lower rate of return from the Social
Security system than current retirees.

Legally, what is commonly referred to as Social Security is two separate programs: Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI). The two funds are inextricably
linked, both from a political and financial perspective, and common practice is to present data for
these two funds jointly. The data presented in this report follows this practice, but as does the
current policy debate, this report focuses on issues relating to OASI—the retirement portion of
the Social Security trust fund.123
The financial status of the Medicare trust fund is even more precarious than that of Social
Security. They are related yet separate issues; however, for the sake of simplification, this report
does not consider the important issue of Medicare funding. Politicians—and current and future
retirees—must also consider the need to address the problems of Medicare.
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
In a little more than two decades, the Social Security system will start paying out more than it
collects, and a decade after that, all the trust fund’s assets will be depleted. With only current
income from payroll taxes available, Social Security will be able to fund only three-quarters of
its scheduled benefit payments.

These statements are based on projections by the Social Security Administration (SSA) using
“intermediate” assumptions about population changes and economic growth. Each year, the

1 In June 1998, over 44 million persons received Social Security benefits. Sixty-two percent (27.4 million) were
retired workers and 11 percent (4.8 million) were nondisabled widows and widowers. Seventy-two percent (31.8
million) of the total were age sixty-five or older, and another 8.8 percent (3.9 million) were age sixty-two to sixtyfour. Another 6.8 percent (3.0 million) were children under age eighteen. Benefit payments from Social Security
trust funds for the month of June 1998 were $31.2 billion. Average monthly benefits were $766 for retired workers
and $733 for nondisabled widows and widowers (www.ssa.gov/statistics/highssd.html ).
2 In June 1998, 5.5 million beneficiaries were receiving payments on the basis of disability. Of the $31.1 billion of
benefits paid in June 1998, $4.0 billion were payment of disability benefits. For disabled workers, average monthly
benefits in June 1998 were $722.
3 According to the 1998 annual report to Medicare’s Board of Trustees, projected annual expenditures will exceed
annual receipts in the Medicare trust fund in the year 2008.
2

actuaries at the SSA make projections about the financial status of the Social Security system
during the following seventy-five years as part of their annual report to the Social Security fund
trustees. Because projections over a seventy-five-year horizon are inherently uncertain, the
actuaries present three sets of estimates. The intermediate-cost estimate is based on economic
and demographic assumptions that are the actuaries’ best guess as to what the future holds. The
high-cost estimate sets all the variables at the most pessimistic levels within a reasonable range.
The low-cost estimate sets all the variables at their most optimistic levels. The results of these
three sets of estimates are summarized in exhibit 1.1 and are depicted graphically in exhibit 1.2.
The tax rate change needed to restore the balance is based on the assumption that such change is
enacted immediately.
Exhibit 1.1

Summary of Low-, Intermediate-, and High-Cost Projections
by Social Security Administration of Trust Fund Finances
Maximum Ratio of
Trust Fund Assets to Year Maximum Fund
Current Expenses
Balance Attained

Year Fund Is
Exhausted

Tax Rate Change to
Taxable Payroll to
Restore Balance

Low cost

496%

2018

Never

-0.25%

Intermediate

324%

2012

2032

2.19%

High cost

218%

2006

2022

5.42%

Source:

1998 Trustees’ Report, Tables 1.G2 and 1.G3 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/trig.html#pgfld=1826).

The three cost assumptions in exhibit 1.1 reflect maximum fund balances under which tax
receipts, and not interest income assets, are counted. Annual tax receipts are not adequate to
cover expenditures beginning in the year 2012. Beginning with 2013, the tax income projected
under present law is expected to be insufficient to cover program expenditures, and it will be
necessary to draw upon the annual interest earned on trust fund assets, to make up the shortfall.
Total income, including interest earnings, is expected to exceed expenditures until 2021.

Under intermediate assumptions, the Social Security trust fund will continue to grow during the
next fifteen years. Beginning in 2012, however, benefits paid will exceed interest earned and
taxes paid into the fund. Deficit spending will then exhaust the trust fund by the year 2032, a
little more than three decades from now. After that, the Social Security system will bring in
current contributions sufficient to cover only about three-quarters of its scheduled benefit
payments. If the trust fund peaks sooner than 2032, this figure declines further. Under high-cost
projections, the Social Security trust fund balance reaches its peak in 2006 and entirely depletes
its fund balances by 2022. Under low-cost projections, however, the Social Security trust fund is
never depleted and there is no long-term financing problem.
One common measure of the financial condition of Social Security is referred to as the “actuarial
balance” of the fund. The actuarial balance is the percentage-point change in the Social Security
tax rate (currently at 12.4 percent of taxable payroll) necessary to avoid any shortfalls in benefit
payments, assuming that tax-rate change were effective immediately and were kept in place
throughout the seventy-five-year projection period. The balance ranges from a small surplus of
0.25 percent of taxable payroll under low-cost assumptions to a large deficit of 5.42 percent of
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payroll under high-cost assumptions. Under intermediate-cost assumptions, financial soundness
could be restored to the system with an immediate and permanent increase in the tax rate of 2.19
percent. Taxable payroll is wages and salaries paid in employment that is covered under the
Social Security program and is subject to Social Security tax (that is, under the maximum annual
taxable amount).
Exhibit 1.2

Projected Assets of the Combined Social Security Trust Fund

Year
Source:

1998 Trustees’ Report (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3B3-1.html), (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3B3-2.html),
(www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3B3-3.html).

Exhibit 1.2 reflects accumulated Social Security tax receipts plus annual interest earned on the
fund balance, minus annual expenditures. Total income, including interest earnings, is expected
to exceed expenditures until 2021. It will then be necessary to draw on accumulated trust fund
assets, effectively redeeming assets to make up the shortfall. If no corrective action were taken,
trust fund assets would be exhausted by the end of 2032.
Under intermediate assumptions, the Social Security deficit is approximately 2 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) beginning in the year 2030. Under high-cost projections, the Social
Security deficit is approximately 3 percent of GDP in 2030 and grows steadily to almost 5
percent of GDP by end of the seventy-five-year estimation period. Under low-cost assumptions,
the Social Security deficit never gets higher than 0.5 percent of GDP (about the year 2030) and
thereafter actually gets smaller. Although benefits paid exceed expenses under the low-cost
scenario, the trust fund does not have a deficit because interest earned on trust fund assets is
sufficient to cover the difference. Exhibit 1.3 illustrates this alternative view of the magnitude of
Social Security’s financial problems.
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Exhibit 1.3

Projected Social Security Surplus and Deficit, as a Percentage of GDP, 1997-2070

Source:

1998 Trustees' Report (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3C1-2), (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3C1-1),
(www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/lr3C1-3).

Although the uncertainty of long-term projections is widely acknowledged, demographers and
economists generally agree that the intermediate assumptions contain no significant biases. The
bipartisan Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods of the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on
Social Security agreed that the financial projections done by the SSA on the intermediate-cost
basis provide reasonable conclusions about the overall status of the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) and the Disability Insurance (DI) programs.
REASONS FOR MAJOR REVISIONS IN PROJECTIONS SINCE 1983

In 1983, when Congress reduced benefits and earmarked income-tax receipts on Social Security
benefits to the trust fund, the Social Security trust fund was then projected to increase to $20
trillion and be in surplus through 2065. Currently, the trust fund is projected to last only until
2032 and to peak at about $4 trillion.
A variety of factors account for most of the projected increase in long-range costs. One factor,
which has nothing to do with the accuracy of the estimates, is the moving of the seventy-fiveyear projection period forward in time. Given the progressively gloomy forecast for Social
Security, each new seventy-five-year projection period includes fewer surplus years at the begin
ning of the period (that is, in the 1980s and 1990s) and more deficit years at the end of the period
(in the 2060s and 2070s).
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A second factor contributing to larger projected deficits is the higher-than-anticipated growth in
the disability caseload. This occurred because a combination of legislative, regulatory, and
judicial actions made it easier for individuals to qualify for disability benefits. This factor may be
reduced in future years as a result of a 1997 legislative change that removes drug and alcohol
addiction as qualifying disabilities.
A third element of a higher post-1983 projected deficit is the net effect of various changes in the
forecasting methodology.
It is noteworthy that changes in economic assumptions and demographic assumptions are not on
balance responsible for the emergence of deficit projections since 1983. True, the birth rate has
been declining and longevity increasing, and both of these factors are detrimental to the trust
fund’s soundness. These trends, however, were anticipated in 1983. In fact, projections of these
variables were slightly pessimistic. There have been reductions in the assumed real rate of wage
growth, but these were not large enough to offset the favorable changes in demographic assump
tions.
As previously noted, the birth rate and longevity estimates were substantially correct at the time
of the 1983 projections. They are indirectly responsible, however, for the projected deficits
through their impact on the new “out” years in the current seventy-five-year projections. These
factors, along with the refinements in methodology and economic assumptions, combine to
create the current deficit projections. A summary of the factors that caused changing estimates
are shown in exhibit 1.4.
Exhibit 1.4

Changes in the Actuarial Balance of the Social Security Trust Fund
From the 1983 Estimates to the 1994 Estimates
Percent of Taxable
Payroll
Balance in 1983 report

+0.02

(#1) Methodology and other minor changes

-1.02

(#2) More pessimistic economic assumptions

-0.81

(#3) Disability assumptions

-0.65

(#4) Forward shift in valuation period

-0.48

(#5) Legislative changes

+0.10

(#6) “Better” demographic assumptions

+0.71

Balance in the 1994 report

-2.13

Source:

Lawrence H. Thompson, “Overview of Social Security Issues” (presented at the 1994-1995
Advisory Council on Social Security, Washington, D.C., 1995).

6

MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS AFFECTING PROJECTIONS

Although many factors play a role in projected Social Security shortfalls, the key considerations
are demographic. First was the sharp spike in births after World War II. The “postwar baby
boom” was at its height from 1951 through 1966. These baby boomers, now varying in age from
thirty-two to forty-seven, will start to retire within the next decade. Since 1966, birth rates have
declined dramatically.
Social Security would have financial problems even if there never were a postwar baby boom. Its
problems are rooted in a trend toward ever-greater longevity and the fact that Americans are
retiring earlier. All of this means that there is a dramatic decline in the ratio of workers
contributing to the system relative to retirees enjoying the benefits.

Basic Arithmetic Behind the Numbers
Economic models used to project the seventy-five-year actuarial deficit of the Social Security
system involve hundreds of variables and thousands of equations. The key, however, to
understanding Social Security financing has its basis in common sense. An increase in the
number of Social Security beneficiaries and a decrease in the number of workers contributing
into the system increase the Social Security deficit. So it follows that an increase in the ratio of
beneficiaries to workers impairs Social Security financially. If the system’s current financial
problems had to be characterized with a single statistic, it would be the dramatic decline in the
ratio of beneficiaries to workers. Whereas today, 3.3 workers support each retiree, by 2040 that
number is projected to drop to 2.0 and stabilize at about 1.8 in 2070 (see exhibit 1.5). The
projected decrease in the ratio of workers to retirees, frequently cited as the cause of the
emerging deficit, has not changed significantly from estimates made in 1983.
Exhibit 1.5

Ratio of Workers to Beneficiaries, 1985-2075

Source: 1998 OASDI Trustees' Report, Figure I.G2 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/trig.html#pgfld=1789 ).
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Although disability rates and trends in early retirement are all important factors in determining
the number of retirees, the key demographic variable determining the number of beneficiaries is
life expectancy. Similarly, although immigration and labor-force-participation rates are
important, the key demographic variable for determining the number of workers is the birth rate.
Both mortality rates and birth rates have been declining recently, and both are expected to
continue to decline. They are the two most important demographic variables in long-term
projections of Social Security finances.
Demographics

Birth Rate
The total birth rate is not expected to return to the high levels of the two decades following
World War II. Several changes in our society have occurred during the past thirty years that have
contributed to reducing the number of children born. Some of these changes are increased
availability and use of birth control, increased female participation in the labor force, increased
divorce rate, and increased postponement of marriage and childbearing among young women.
No significant reversal of these changes is anticipated.

Social Security actuaries estimate that ultimately total birth rates will average 2.2 children per
woman under the low-cost alternative, 1.9 under the intermediate alternative, and 1.6 under the
high-cost alternative. The total birth rate for each alternative is assumed to be reached in the year
2022. Exhibit 1.6 provides a summary of the data on historical and projected birth rates in the
United States.4 As shown in exhibit 1.7, varying these assumptions—and holding all other
variables constant—results in a range of estimated actuarial deficits between 1.81 percent and
2.57 percent of taxable payroll.
Mortality
There is no doubt that Americans are living longer, and that increasing longevity is expected to
continue into the future. There is some disagreement among demographers about the size of this
increase, and the uncertainty is reflected in the range of the Social Security projections. 5

Under intermediate projections, the mortality rate declines by 35 percent from the beginning of
the seventy-five-year projection period to the end. Under low-cost assumptions, the mortality
rate is assumed to decline by 54 percent. Under high-cost assumptions, the mortality rate is
4 The starting point for projecting future rates of fertility is the recent history of fertility in the United States. During
the period 1917 to 1925, the total fertility rate was more than three children per woman. Over time, the total fertility
rate has steadily declined with only brief periods of stability. The estimated total fertility rate, based on preliminary
data, for 1995 is 2.02.
5 Demographers trying to predict future life expectancy must take into account a wide variety of factors including
advances in medicine, the presence of environmental pollutants, improvements in exercise and nutrition, the
incidence of violence, the emergence of new forms of disease, improvements in prenatal care, the prevalence of
cigarette smoking, and the misuse of drugs and alcohol. An examination of the data on death rates since 1900
reveals several distinct periods of mortality reduction. Social Security actuaries assume that the death rate will
decline steadily for the next seventy-five years.
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assumed to decline by 16 percent. Varying these assumptions—and holding all other variables
constant—results in a range of estimated actuarial deficits between 1.56 percent and 2.90 percent
of payroll (see exhibit 1.7).
Exhibit 1.6

Number of Children Born to Woman in Her Lifetime

Historical and Projected U.S. Birth Rates

Exhibit 1.7

Impact of Changes in Demographic Assumptions on the
Estimated Long-Range Actuarial Balance of the Social Security Trust Fund
What Helps the Social
Security Trust Fund?

Estimated Long-Range
Actuarial Balance
Low
Inter
High
Cost
mediate
Cost

Assumptions Made in Estimates
Under Low-, Intermediate-, and
High-Cost Estimates

A. Total fertility rate

Higher fertility rate

-1.81

-2.19

-2.57

Ultimate (2022) fertility rate =
2.2, 1.9, 1.6 children per woman

B. Mortality rates

Higher mortality rate

-1.56

-2.19

-2.90

Reduction in mortality rate =
16%, 35%, 54%

C. Net immigration

More immigration

-2.04

-2.19

-2.27

Annual immigration =
1.15 mil., 0.90 mil., 0.75 mil.

Demographic
Variable

Note: The intermediate estimate of 2.19 percent is the same intermediate estimate presented in exhibit 1.1. The low-cost and high-cost estimates
displayed to the left and right of this estimate show the estimated deficit that results from modifying the variable referenced in that row.

Source:

1998 Trustees’ Report, Tables II.G.1 Through II.G.3 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/triid.html#pgfld=1008987).

In terms of life expectancy, under intermediate projections a male born in 2040 can expect on
average to live 77.2 years and a female can expect to live 82.3 years. For 1995 births, the
comparable figures are 72.6 and 79.0 years, respectively. Exhibit 1.8 illustrates historical and
projected at-birth life expectancies.
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Exhibit 1.8

Historical and Projected Life Expectancies, at Birth

1935

1995

2040: Intermediate

2040: Lowcost

2040: High cost

Calendar Year

Source: 1998 Trustees' Report, Table II.D.2 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/triid.html#pgfld=996936).

Another way of illustrating the increased burden of longer life expectancy on the Social Security
system is to observe the changes in life expectancy at age sixty-five. A male turning sixty-five in
1935 could expect to live 11.9 more years; a female could expect to live 13.2 more years. Social
Security actuaries estimate life expectancies for those turning age sixty-five in 2040 will be 17.5
for males and 20.8 for females. This is an increase of 4.3 and 8.9 years, respectively, over the
1935 figures.6 Exhibit 1.9 illustrates historical and projected life expectancies at age sixty-five.

Although the life-expectancy assumptions used by Social Security are generally considered
reliable and realistic, there are other data and some demographers who question these estimates.
In fact, life expectancy estimates developed by the Census Bureau are consistently longer than
those used in the Social Security intermediate-cost model.7

6 Eugene C. Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Answers to
Reform (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1994), 41.
7 Ronald D. Lee and Lawrence R. Canter, “Modeling and Forecasting U.S. Mortality,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association 87 (September 1992): 659-671; Ronald D. Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar, “Stochastic
Population Forecasts for the United States: Beyond High, Medium, and Low,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association 89 (December 1994): 1 175-1189. The authors concluded that the Social Security life-expectancy
assumptions are understated. However, Neil G. Bennett and S. Jay Olshansky (“Forecasting U.S. Age Structure and
the Future of Social Security: The Impact of Adjustments to Official Mortality Schedules,” Population and
Development Review 22 (December 1996): 703-727) suggested that even the low cost assumptions for life
expectancy were too long.
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Exhibit 1.9

Historical and Projected Life Expectancies, at Age 65

Source: 1998 Trustees' Report, Table II.D.2 (www.ssa.gov/0ACT/TR/TR98/triid.html#pgfld=996936).

Immigration

Social Security actuaries estimate that for the year 2000 and later, the annual number of total net
immigrants will be 1,150,000 (under the low-cost alternative), 900,000 (under the intermediate
alternative), and 750,000 (under the high-cost alternative). Annual levels of net legal
immigration are assumed to be 700,000 (under the low-cost alternative), 600,000 (under the
intermediate alternative), and 550,000 (under the high-cost alternative) for 2000 and later. The
net other-than-legal levels of immigration for each year are assumed to be 450,000; 300,000; and
200,000, per year, under low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. As
shown in exhibit 1.7, varying these assumptions—and holding all other variables constant—
results in estimated actuarial deficits of 2.04 percent, 2.19 percent, and 2.27 percent of payroll.
Legal immigrants are generally assumed to be younger and thus contribute to the Social Security
system longer. Thus, higher levels of legal immigration are beneficial.
Economic Assumptions

Productivity Growth

In addition to demographic assumptions, economic assumptions are also important determinants
of the soundness of Social Security. The most important variable here is probably the estimates
of future increases in productivity. To understand why, it is important to remember that benefits
are adjusted annually to keep pace with inflation, whereas contributions to Social Security are
directly related to the growth rate of wages. Depending on the underlying economics, wage
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increases may or may not be related to inflation. In general, an increase in inflation is often
accompanied by an increase in wages. However, not all wage increases are tied to inflation.
Wage increases will not be inflationary when there is an increase in worker productivity. When
there are noninflationary wage increases (due to increases in productivity), contributions to the
Social Security system will increase at a faster rate than payments to beneficiaries.

Changes in productivity growth—called the “real-wage differential” by Social Security
analysts—can have a large impact on the soundness of the Social Security system. The SSA’s
best estimate is that productivity growth will increase at an average annual rate of 0.9 percent in
the future. Under the low-cost scenario, the average annual rate of productivity growth would be
1.4 percent, and under high-cost assumptions, it would be 0.4 percent. Exhibit 1.10 shows that
productivity increases in this range would result in a range of actuarial deficits between 1.66
percent of payroll and 2.70 percent of payroll. In the SSA’s estimates, productivity is the most
important economic variable in determining the range of official Social Security deficits.
Exhibit 1.10

Impact of Key Demographic Assumptions on the
Estimated Long-Range Actuarial Balance of the Social Security Trust Fund
Demographic
Variable

What Helps the Social
Security Trust Fund?

Estimated Long-Range
Actuarial Balance
Inter
High
Low
Cost
mediate
Cost

Assumptions Made in Estimates
Under Low-, Intermediate-, and
High-Cost Estimates

A. Productivity
growth rate

Higher productivity
growth rate

-1.66

-2.19

-2.70

Annual growth in productivity =
1.4%, 0.9%, 0.4%

B. Inflation-adjusted
interest rate

Higher inflation-adjusted
interest rate

-1.72

-2.19

-2.74

Inflation-adjusted interest rate =
3.5%, 2.8%, 2.0%

Note: The intermediate estimate of 2.19 percent is the same intermediate estimate presented in exhibit 1.1. The low-cost and high-cost estimates
displayed to the left and right of this estimate show the estimated deficit that results from modifying the variable referenced in that row.
Source:

1998 Trustees’ Report, Tables II.G.4 and II.G.6 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/triig.html#pgfld=1009456).

Inflation-Adjusted Interest Rate

Another important economic assumption is the actual rate of return over the inflation rate that the
Social Security trust fund can expect on investments. Under intermediate assumptions, the
inflation-adjusted rate of return on assets—assuming current restrictions to investments in
government securities continue to apply—is assumed to be 2.8 percent. Under low-cost
assumptions, the real rate of return is assumed to be 3.5 percent. Under high-cost assumptions,
the real rate of return is assumed to be 1.9 percent. Changes in interest rates in this range result in
a range of actuarial deficits between 1.72 percent of payroll and 2.74 percent of payroll (see
exhibit 1.10). These are significant changes but, as discussed later, much larger interest rate
effects are possible if the Social Security trust fund is allowed to invest in equity (with projected
long-term real returns in excess of 7 percent) and if Social Security is able to accumulate a fund
balance at a more rapid pace.
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CONCLUSION
Is Social Security in a financial crisis? Social Security is a major component of the financial
security of millions of retirees. This critical element of retirement security, especially for future
generations of the nation’s elderly poor, faces a serious financial shortfall. Under some official
projections, Social Security might be unable to meet its obligations as early as two decades from
now. Under the best-guess projections, however, the inability to meet obligations may not occur
for three decades. Under the most optimistic official projections, the shortfall may never occur at
all. Even when the shortfall does occur, it does not mean that Social Security benefits will be
entirely unavailable, as often implied in popular press accounts; it means only that benefits at
about three-quarters of current levels can be paid.

There is not much dispute about these figures, but there does seem to be some disagreement
about how to characterize them. In general, those who wish to preserve the basic structure of the
current Social Security system are inclined to characterize the current fiscal imbalance as small
and manageable. In contrast, proponents of more dramatic changes to the Social Security
system—in particular, advocates of a system of private accounts—are more likely to characterize
the current fiscal imbalance as a financial crisis.
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Chapter 2
SOCIAL SECURITY AND POVERTY

SUMMARY
•

The reduction in poverty among the elderly is the major accomplishment of the current
Social Security system. The poverty rate among the elderly is now approximately 12
percent—the lowest of any major age group. If Social Security benefits were not available,
and there were no other changes in the economy or government programs, the poverty rate
among the elderly would be 54 percent. No sound empirical data exists on what the impact
would be on poverty levels if Social Security benefits were cut to three-quarters of current
benefit levels, as has been projected for the year 2032.

•

In general, reform plans that move Social Security toward a defined-contribution plan,
particularly privatization plans, would lessen the features of the system that redistribute
income from high-income to low-income households.

•

Any reduction in the antipoverty element of Social Security is likely to put increased
financial pressure on other government antipoverty programs.

•

For two-thirds of beneficiaries, Social Security provides more than half of total income. For
almost one-third, it provides more than 90 percent of income.

INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the founding of the Social Security system more than six decades ago, there has been a
debate about the purpose of Social Security. Is it a retirement savings plan, or is it a wealth
redistribution system designed to combat elderly poverty? Does poverty or the threat of poverty
exist for a large segment of our nation’s elderly? This chapter discusses the facts of elderly
poverty in our country today.
There can be little doubt that the primary objective of the founders of Social Security was
reduction of poverty among the elderly. This is reflected in the words of President Roosevelt
three years after Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1935:
Long before the economic blight of the depression descended on the Nation, millions of our
people were living in wastelands of want and fear. Men and women too old and infirm to work
either depended on those who had but little to share, or spent their remaining years within the
walls of a poorhouse. Fatherless children early learned the meaning of being a burden to relatives
or to the community. Men and women, still strong, still young, but discarded as gainful workers,
were drained of self-confidence and self-respect.
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The millions of today want, and have a right to, the same security their forefathers sought—the
assurance that with health and the willingness to work they will find a place for themselves in the
social and economic system of the time.
Because it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to build their own security singlehanded, Government must now step in and help them lay the foundation stones, just as
Government in the past has helped lay the foundation of business and industry. We must face the
fact that in this country we have a rich man’s security and a poor man’s security and that the
Government owes equal obligations to both. National security is not a half and half manner: it is
all or none.
The Social Security Act offers to all our citizens a workable and working method of meeting
urgent present needs and of forestalling future need. It utilizes the familiar machinery of our
Federal-State government to promote the common welfare and the economic stability of the
Nation.
The Act does not offer anyone, either individually or collectively, an easy life—nor was it ever
intended so to do. None of the sums of money paid out to individuals in assistance or in insurance
will spell anything approaching abundance. But they will furnish that minimum necessity to keep
a foothold; and that is the kind of protection Americans want.1

Since the administration of President Roosevelt, the Social Security system has become the
central component of retirement security for most of America’s elderly. About 90 percent of
households with elderly Americans get Social Security benefits. Among the highest-income
quintile (one-fifth) of elderly, Social Security benefits account for about one-quarter of total
income. For the second-highest quintile, Social Security benefits accounts for about one-half of
total income. However, among the low-income elderly, Social Security is particularly important.
Among the bottom two income quintiles of today’s elderly, Social Security accounts for more
than three-quarters of total income.

The reduction in poverty among the elderly is the major accomplishment of the current Social
Security system. Many proposed reforms that would privatize the Social Security system would
have fewer, if any, guarantees of minimum pensions for low-income retirees. Any benefit
formula, such as the current Social Security primary insurance amount (PIA) formula, that shifts
funds to low-income recipients is in direct conflict with the defining characteristics of a
privatization plan that includes individually defined-contribution accounts. Although usually
couched in terms of economics, the debate about privatization versus the current system has
strong political and social undertones. In the current system, the redistribution of benefits to lowincome individuals is obscured by complex formulas that few individuals understand and by the
nearly universal participation in the current system: Everybody pays in; everybody gets
something out. Opponents of privatization know that privatization could make any redistribution
aspect of the system much more explicit and thereby dilute support for redistribution.*

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Radio Address on the Third Anniversary of the Social Security, 15 August 1938,
(available on the Social Security Administration’s Web site at www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.utml#radio).

16

POVERTY AND SOCIAL SECURITY’S IMPACT ON POVERTY

Elderly Poverty Rates Over Time

The poverty rate for the elderly in 1959 was 35.2 percent, more than double the 17.0 percent
poverty rate for the general adult population. The poverty rate for the elderly has since dropped
by more than two-thirds. The elderly poverty rate in 1996 stands at 10.8 percent and is now less
than the poverty rate for other adults (see exhibit 2.1).
One should also note that the poverty rate for children under the age of eighteen is much higher
than that for the elderly. Social Security has helped alleviate poverty for children but only with a
fraction of the impact it has had on poverty among elderly. Currently, approximately 3 million
Social Security recipients are children under the age of eighteen. This is approximately 6.8
percent of all Social Security recipients.
Exhibit 2.1

U.S. Poverty Rates by Major Age Groups, 1959-1996

Note: 1960-66 not available, except for under age 18.

Source: Lamison-White, U.S. Department of the Census (1997).

Further, 1996 Census Bureau data show that elderly poverty rates increase with age. The poverty
rate is 8.8 percent for those between sixty-five and seventy-four, and 13.3 percent for those
seventy-five and over (see exhibit 2.2). The fact that elderly poverty rates increase with age
could mean increased strains on the social programs in the future. The proportion of the
population that is over eighty-five will more than triple from its current level of 1.4 percent of
the population to 4.6 percent in 2050.
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Exhibit 2.2

Elderly Poverty Rates, by Gender, Age, Race, and Marital Status, 1996
Both

Male

10.8

6.8

13.6

8.8

5.7

11.3

13.3

8.5

16.3

Married

n.a.

4.5

4.3

Single

n.a.

13.4

23.1

9.4

5.7

12.1

African-American

25.3

18.1

29.8

Hispanic

24.4

19.9

27.7

Female

By age:
65 and over
65 to 74

75 and over
By current marital status:
(65 and over)

By race:
(65 and over)
White

Source:

Lamison-White, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997.

Elderly Poverty Rates by Gender, Race, and Marital Status
Although poverty rates of the elderly are now lower than for the rest of the population, serious
pockets of poverty continue to exist for the elderly—particularly among widows, the very old,
and minorities. As shown in exhibit 2.2, older women are twice as likely as men to be in poverty.
For both men and women, single individuals have much higher poverty rates than married
couples. Single men have an elderly poverty rate almost three times as great as the poverty rate
for married men. Single women (including widows and divorcees) have a poverty rate more than
five times the poverty rate of married women.

The poverty rate of the elderly also varies substantially by race. For white Americans, the elderly
poverty rate in 1996 was 9.4 percent. For African-Americans, the elderly poverty rate was 25.3
percent—more than two and half times larger than for white Americans. The poverty rate for
elderly Hispanic Americans (24.4 percent) was only slightly below that for elderly AfricanAmericans.

The Impact of Social Security on Poverty

Social Security is an important component of retirement income. For approximately two-thirds
of beneficiaries, Social Security provides more than half of total income. For almost one-third of
beneficiaries, Social Security provides more than 90 percent of income. And, for 16 percent of
beneficiaries, Social Security provides 100 percent of retirement income. Exhibit 2.3
demonstrates that Social Security plays a pivotal role in reducing poverty.
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Exhibit 2.3

Social Security Benefits as a Share of Total Income for Retirees
■ Less than 50% of income
■ 50-89% of income
□ 90-99% of income

□ 100% of income

Source: Social Security Administration.

Exhibit 2.4 amplifies this point by showing current poverty rates for the elderly alongside
poverty rates that the elderly would experience if they did not receive Social Security benefits.
Currently, 12 percent of individuals age sixty-five or over are in households with income below
the poverty level. If Social Security benefits were not available, the poverty rate for the elderly
would jump from 12 percent to over 54 percent. This is the basis for the oft-repeated statement
that Social Security keeps more than 15 million people above the poverty line. Unless there are
changes in other aspects of the Social Security system or in other government programs, or some
behavioral responses to program changes that increase economic growth in a manner that
benefits low-income households, cuts in benefits would increase poverty among the elderly.

Exhibit 2.4

Elderly Poverty Rates With and Without Social Security Benefits
70%

■ Additional percentage of elderly in poverty

Total

Married

Source: Social Security Administration.
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Nonmarried

Given these dramatic figures, any plan to reform Social Security clearly must give consideration
to its impact on the size and riskiness of benefits paid to the elderly poor and those elderly near
the poverty line. In addition, any reduction in the benefits paid to low- and moderate-income
elderly could place additional financial burdens on federal, state, and local programs as well as
on efforts by charitable organizations to help the elderly poor. This would reverse the trend of
public assistance as a share of total income of elderly declining from 5 percent in 1959 to
1 percent in 1988.

The current Social Security system redistributes income from high- to low-income households
and is responsible for a large reduction in poverty among the elderly. No matter what the
economic benefits of any reform, reality dictates that some redistribution and some guaranteed
minimum income for beneficiaries is needed. Even in Chile’s privatized Social Security system,
which many privatization advocates present as a model for privatization of the U.S. system, there
is still a floor on benefits that guarantees low-income elderly a minimum pension.2
The Special Problem of Elderly Widows

Although Social Security rules are gender neutral, several factors make Social Security less
adequate for women than for men. Because women generally work fewer years than men and,
when women do work, they generally earn less than men, women on average receive
significantly lower monthly benefits than men. In addition, women tend to live longer than men,
which means that any nonannuitized assets must be stretched more thinly over a longer
retirement period. As a result of all of these factors, the problem of elderly poverty is particularly
acute among women. In 1996, the poverty rate of elderly women was double the poverty rate of
elderly men.
Although the poverty rate for elderly married couples is low, the poverty rates for elderly women
who are divorced, separated, never married, or widowed is almost four times higher (see exhibit
2.5). Numerically, the most important of these categories is widows, who account for nearly twothirds (64 percent) of elderly women in poverty.3

One criticism of Social Security benefit payments is that the surviving spouse from one-earner
marriages receives more generous benefits than do earners from two-earner marriages. The
surviving spouse who did not work is entitled to two-thirds of the couple’s retirement benefit
upon death of the other spouse. In the case where the surviving spouse earned half the couple’s
earnings, the surviving spouse is entitled to only one half the couple’s benefit when the other
spouse dies. Concerns about the unfairness of this feature of Social Security as well as concerns
about the poverty of elderly widows in general has lead to several proposals to increase widows’
benefits. Two of the three plans for reform included in the report written by the 1994-1995
Advisory Council on Social Security include proposals to increase surviving spouse benefits
from 50 percent to 75 percent of the benefit that would have been payable to the couple if both
spouses were alive.

2 José Pinera, “The Success of Chile’s Privatized Social Security,” Cato Policy Report 17 (July-August 1995).
3 Steven Sandell, “Adequacy and Equity of Social Security” (presented to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on
Social Security, Washington, D.C., October 1994).
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Exhibit 2.5

Elderly Poverty Rates of Women, by Marital Status, 1992

Source: Steven Sandell, "Adequacy and Equity of Social Security" (presented to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security,
Washington, D.C., October 1994).

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING RETIREMENT SECURITY
Pensions

The marked decline in elderly poverty is not solely attributable to Social Security. Social
Security benefits have grown dramatically, but so have other sources of retirement security.
Analysts like to refer to Social Security as one leg of the “three-legged stool” of retirement
income. The other two legs of the stool, private saving and pensions, also have grown. However,
as a percentage of total income for the elderly, Social Security has grown. From 1962 to 1994,
Social Security income, as a percentage of total income for the elderly, has grown from 31
percent to 42 percent (see exhibit 2.6).4 Income from pensions has also grown rapidly. Pension
income includes payments from private pensions or annuities; government employee pensions;
as well as Railroad Retirement, Individual Retirement Account, Keogh plan, and 401(k) plan
payments. As a percentage of total income for individuals age sixty-five and over, pension
income has increased from 9 percent to 19 percent.

Furthermore, pension coverage has become more widespread. Data from the Social Security
Administration show that only 18 percent of the elderly received pension income in 1962. By
1994, this figure had increased to 43 percent.5
4 David M. Cutler, “Reexamining the Three-Legged Stool,” in Social Security: What Role for the Future? Edited by
Peter A. Diamond, David C. Lindeman, and Howard Young (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Social
Insurance, 1996).
5 Social Security Administration, Income of the Aged Chartbook (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research and
Statistics, February 1996)
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Exhibit 2.6

Sources of Income for Population Age 65 and Over, 1962 and 1994

Source: Social Security Administration.

In assessing overall retirement security, it is also important to recognize the increase in the
importance of defined-contribution plans relative to defined-benefit plans. Participation rates in
defined-benefit plans—more commonly available to employees of large corporations—have
declined slightly over the last three decades. In contrast, there have been dramatic increases in
the participation rates of defined-contribution plans. Employees who have defined-contribution
plans as their only pension plan increased from 13 percent in 1975 to 35 percent in 1989.
Similarly, the percentage of employees with defined-contribution plans that supplement definedbenefit plans has more than tripled.
The costs and risks of a defined-benefit plan are often too high for small- and medium-sized
firms. Without the option of defined-contribution plans, many employees simply would not have
any pension. Any increases in pension benefits are welcome and essential to an individual’s
retirement security as well as the nation’s long-term economic growth, but it is important to
recognize that Social Security is a defined-benefit retirement plan, and that many employees
depend on Social Security to provide a basic minimum annuity benefit for their retirement. All
other things being equal, the increased presence of defined-contribution plans generally increases
retirement security but does not provide the same type of retirement security as Social Security.
Benefits from a defined-contribution plan depend primarily on market returns, whereas financial
markets do not directly affect the Social Security benefits individuals received. Although market
rates of return may be higher than rates of return on a defined-benefit plan, there is absolutely no
guarantee and no adjustment for adverse circumstances. Under Social Security, participants face
far less risk than they would under a defined-contribution plan. Social Security benefits are tied
directly to prior wages and, therefore, guarantee certain replacement rates that depend on prior
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income levels. Initial Social Security benefits are indexed to overall growth in wages; therefore,
as the economy grows, so do benefits. Subsequent benefits are adjusted for growth in the
consumer price index, so there is complete protection against inflation.

Savings
In addition to Social Security and pensions, saving is the third critical aspect of retirement
security. Income from assets as a percentage of total income of the elderly has grown less rapidly
than income from Social Security or pensions. Most analysts agree that Americans do not save
enough. There is considerable disagreement, however, about the size of the shortfall. These
disagreements involve a variety of issues. Does “enough” mean that retirees must maintain their
preretirement standard of living, or the same standard of living as that of their parents in
retirement? Because most individuals simply do not wish to move when they retire, should
housing values be included in retirement assets? How much of saving is for retirement and how
much is for bequests? One rule of thumb used by financial planners is that retirement income
should be about two-thirds of preretirement income. Many factors must be taken into account for
planning each individual’s needs. On the one hand, taxes and housing costs are generally lower
than their preretirement levels. On the other hand, medical expenses could be much higher.

The empirical evidence on future retirement security is mixed, and conclusions often depend on
the standards of comparison as much as empirical measurement. Analysts have estimated that
families are saving only about one-third of what is necessary to maintain their preretirement
standard of living. This estimate, however, does not include housing values as part of assets.
When housing values are included, saving adequacy rises dramatically from one-third to more
than 80 percent. It is also estimated that for households with pensions, the adequacy of saving is
between 50 percent and 90 percent and for those households without pensions the adequacy of
saving is between 20 percent and 50 percent. Finally, a 1993 study by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) concluded that baby boomers will have retirement income that is at least as great
as and probably greater than their parents’.6
As in the case of pensions, it is important to look beyond the aggregate numbers to assess the
retirement security of low-income families. A substantial number of low-income families have
very small amounts of retirement assets. In general, low-income families save a smaller portion
of their incomes than do middle- and high-income families; therefore, their saving for retirement
is much less adequate. The CBO study on retirement security study shows that the lowest fifth of
households had a wealth-to-income ratio of only 17 percent, whereas the median household had
a wealth-to-income ratio of 123 percent.7
IMPACT OF PROPOSALS ON POVERTY

Like the federal income tax, the Social Security system plays a major role in the government’s
redistribution of income from high-income to low-income families. As intended by the founders
6 See Joyce Manchester, “Progress for the Baby Boom Generation and Beyond” (presented to the 1994-1995
Advisory Council on Social Security, Wash
ington, D.C., 24 June 1994), for a review of the economic evidence.
7 See Manchester, figure 2.
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of Social Security, the system has provided income security for retirees and is particularly
important for the low-income elderly. Without Social Security, a majority of Americans would
retire in poverty.

If the major objective of Social Security is the elimination of elderly poverty, certainly a more
targeted system than the current one could be devised. Any efforts, however, to further target
benefits to low-income individuals would encounter severe economic and political problems.
Targeting benefits to the poor, for example, through means testing, would create economic
incentives for individuals to work less as well as to accumulate less (and hide) wealth. The
political problems with means testing are at least twofold. First, “welfare” programs pit wealthy
against poor, which inevitably results in a drain on program resources. Second, the stigma of
“welfare” makes the program unattractive to certain beneficiaries.
Proponents of privatization argue that Social Security reform does not have to be a zero-sum
proposition. First of all, to the extent that Social Security reforms require prefunding of benefits
and to the extent that these funds are invested in equity securities—whether in individual or
system-wide accounts—more Social Security benefits can be paid with smaller contributions.
Although this is unlikely to have any significant impact on the overall size of the economy, as
noted elsewhere in this report, it is likely to increase resources flowing into the Social Security
system. Thus, it is possible for a reformed Social Security system to have less redistribution but
still make low-income households better off.
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Chapter 3
SOCIAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FAIRNESS

SUMMARY
•

The increased sophistication of the American public makes it increasingly difficult to avoid
the comparison of Social Security with other investments.

•

Social Security was created as a pay-as-you-go system in which the initial beneficiaries
received benefits that were greater than if they had received a return on their invested
contributions. In this system, initial contributions were paid out to beneficiaries rather than
being invested to “prefund” future benefits. As there was limited prefunding, the return on
the system is tied to growth in population and productivity, not return on invested assets.

•

The rate of return on the Social Security contributions that are accumulated in the existing
pay-as-you-go system is limited by the restriction on investment in select government
securities.

•

The rate of return earned on an individual’s Social Security contributions are affected by
gender, marital status, and income level, due in part to social policy considerations, which
create returns unrelated to actual contributions. Married couples benefit from spousal and
survivor benefits, which also act to diminish returns to two-earner couples relative to oneearner couples. Low-income individuals benefit from the Social Security benefit formula,
which includes a declining fraction of income in the calculation, reducing the rate of return
for high-income beneficiaries.

•

The vast majority of today’s Social Security recipients are receiving and will continue to
receive more than their actuarially fair share of benefits. In other words, their contributions
into the Social Security system have earned them an above-average rate of return.

•

Future retirees, particularly singles and two-earner couples and those with high incomes,
will earn below-market returns, even if all promised benefits can be paid.

•

Fairness can be evaluated by comparing rates of return as if Social Security benefits were a
defined-contribution retirement plan (putting aside issues of poverty and social concerns).
Reform plans that provide fair returns generate the least economic distortion.

INTRODUCTION
Social Security was founded in the midst of the Great Depression. At its inception, its primary
objective was elimination of poverty among the elderly. It was expected that the half of the
Social Security tax paid by employers could be used for social purposes, while the half paid by
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the employee would be used to directly benefit the contributing employee.1 Much has changed
since 1935. However, as has been shown in the discussion of poverty, Social Security keeps the
majority of Americans over sixty-five out of poverty.
Individual fairness or money’s worth is one measure of fairness to be considered when
evaluating options for Social Security reform. Other measures of fairness are addressed
elsewhere in the study. This chapter considers fairness as measured by money’s worth; the reader
should consider all measures of fairness in developing a balanced view of reform options for
Social Security.

Social Security was founded when most pensions were defined-benefit plans. There were no
explicit deductions from wages to fund these plans, and workers were not involved in the
investment strategy of the portfolios used to fund these plans. Until relatively recently, most
Americans saved in banks, where interest rates were set by regulation. There was little direct
investment in the stock market, and mutual funds were available only to a small number of
investors. Now most pension plans are defined-contribution plans and many families, either
directly or through mutual funds, invest in a wide array of financial instruments. The greater
sophistication of the American public makes it increasingly difficult to avoid the comparison of
Social Security with other investment and retirement plans. Increasingly, there are questions
about whether Social Security provides a good return on investment. Many commentators refer
to this as the “money’s worth” issue.
Typically, the rate of return on Social Security is calculated by determining the rate of interest on
an account that would receive deposits equal to Social Security taxes and make distributions
equal to Social Security benefits. If the computed rate of return exceeds the rate of return
available in financial markets, the Social Security recipient is said to have received his or her
money’s worth. Analysts also calculate a related statistic to show the value of Social Security to
beneficiaries: the net Social Security transfer. This is the dollar value of participating in the
Social Security system. This figure can be negative if the expected payments into the system
exceed expected benefits. If the computed internal rate of return on Social Security exceeds the
market rate of return, the net Social Security transfer is a positive dollar amount. If the market
rate of return exceeds that rate of return on Social Security, the net transfer is a negative dollar
amount.

SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM BOOM TO BUST
High Returns During Start-Up

Social Security is routinely considered the most popular program the federal government offers.
There should be little wonder about this: Approximately 90 percent of retirees receive a monthly
check from Social Security for an average amount of approximately $756. The vast majority of

1 Lawrence H. Thompson, “Overview of Social Security Issues” (presented to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on
Social Security, Washington, D.C., 1995), 290. See also, Eugene C. Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social
Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Answers to Reform (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press,
1994), 19.
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these beneficiaries did not contribute into the system sufficient amounts to justify these benefits.
In other words, almost all current beneficiaries have received a very profitable return from Social
Security. They have received a return on their contributions that is far greater than would be
available if they had not contributed but instead invested on their own.

What has made this possible was the explicit decision by Social Security system founders to not
allow the trust fund to accumulate any significant assets. It is a characteristic feature of any payas-you-go retirement plan that the first generation of beneficiaries receives benefits with actuarial
value far in excess of their contributions.2*Further, the start-up period for Social Security has
been effectively expanded by large increases in benefits through the early 1970s.

Low Returns After Start-Up
Unfortunately, as a pay-as-you-go system matures, the excess benefits available from the start-up
are no longer available. The returns on investment in Social Security for new retirees are much
lower than for those available to older retirees, and they are expected to continue to decline. If
the public’s enthusiasm for the Social Security program was attributable to the high returns
available to participants, there will no doubt be a diminution in popularity in the future.
Similarly, lawmakers’ reluctance to touch this “third rail” of American politics should also
dissipate as more individuals, particularly young people, are shortchanged by the program.

As first demonstrated by Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson in 1958, when a pay-as-you-go system
matures, the return on investment from this system is in general far less than that available from
investment in capital assets. Samuelson showed that the pay-as-you-go Social Security system
will generally provide returns equal to the sum of the growth rate of the population and of the
growth rate in productivity. Currently, the U.S. Social Security system is a hybrid system with
elements of both a pay-as-you-go and a prefunded system. However, as currently structured, the
prefunded component of Social Security does not help to improve the rate of return on Social
Security contributions because Social Security trust fund investments are limited to U.S.
government securities. To provide a rate of return comparable to private sector investment plans,
the Social Security system would have to increase funding of its obligations and remove
restrictions that prevent investment in anything but Treasury securities.
Data on Declining Returns

As previously noted, the rate of return, in present-value terms, is determined by calculating the
interest factor on an account that would receive deposits equal to Social Security taxes and make
distributions equal to Social Security benefits. There has been a dramatic decline in the rate of
return on Social Security over time. This is shown in exhibit 3.1 and in separate calculations in
exhibit 3.2. In the very earliest years of Social Security, benefits were spectacularly large in
comparison with contributions paid into the system. This is evident by the 36.5 percent return in
2 The first recipient of Social Security benefits, Ida Fuller, paid $22 in Social Security taxes and received
approximately $20,000 in benefits. See “Your Stake in the Fight Over Social Security,” Consumer Reports
(September 1981): 503-510.
3 Paul A. Samuelson, “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or Without the Social Contrivance of
Money,” Journal of Political Economy (1958): 467-482.
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1941 as noted in exhibit 3.1. Even in the 1960s and 1970s, however, rates of return were still
much higher than one would expect from a private pension plan or, as reflected in the prior
paragraphs, higher than one would expect from a mature pay-as-you-go system. During this
period, as noted on exhibit 3.2, part A, the rate of return for a single male was 10.97 percent in
1960 but declined to 1.82 percent in 1995 and is projected to decline to 1 percent by 2030.
Exhibit 3.2, part B, translates the difference in rate of return to the “net Social Security transfer.”
This is expressed in the net benefit (cost) to the beneficiary based on contributions and benefits
comparing the internal rate of return on Social Security to the market rate of return. For example,
in 1960 a single male would receive a net benefit of $36,500 from Social Security, whereas in
1995 a single male would have, through direct contributions and reduced returns, contributed
$5,100 more to the system than he could expect in benefits. By 2030, a single male can expect to
have paid $56,200 more in contributions and reduced returns than he could expect in benefits.

The system in effect was still in its start-up phase before the 1990s due to large benefit increases
paid for with increasing Social Security tax collections. The high-average rates of return before
the 1990s were an aberration, a one-time start-up phenomenon that is not likely to ever return.
The low average returns after the 1990s are the norm for a mature pay-as-you-go system. The
relatively small amount of prefunding will not change this as long as investment is restricted to
government securities. The impact of the system for many beneficiaries in the future will be to
decrease their family wealth through their participation.4
Exhibit 3.1

Average Inflation-Adjusted Rates of Return Over Time

Year Turning Age 65
Source:

Dean R. Leimer, "A Guide to Social Security Money's Worth Issues" (ORS Working Paper No. 67, Division of Economic
Research, Social Security Administration, April 1995).

4 In Exhibits 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, the assumed rate of return (adjusted for inflation) is 2 percent.
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Exhibit 3.2

Impact of Net Social Security on Wealth, Selected Years
A. Real Rate of Return
Year of Retirement

Type of Beneficiary

1960
(%)

1980
(%)

1995
(%)

2010
(%)

2030
(%)

Single male

10.97

4.24

1.82

1.16

1.00

Single female

12.63

5.54

2.89

2.09

1.90

One-earner couple

14.64

7.66

4.79

3.64

3.37

Two-earner couple

13.00

6.16

3.54

2.52

2.29

B. Net Social Security Transfers
Year of Retirement

1960
($000)

1980
($000)

1995
($000)

2010
($000)

2030
($000)

Single male

36.5

39.3

-5.1

-36.3

-56.2

Single female

59.4

80.5

28.1

-0.4

-13.8

One-earner couple

89.9

158.9

122.5

107.3

117.0

Two-earner couple

88.7

133.3

78.6

39.8

29.4

Type of Beneficiary

Source: Eugene C. Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right
and Wrong Answers to Reform (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press), Table A-9.

REDISTRIBUTION AND MONEY’S WORTH WITHIN GENERATIONS
Benefit Computation

The Social Security system calculates benefits based on a percentage of earnings. The percentage
considered in the calculation declines as earnings increase. This creates a disparity between highand low-income households in the rate of return on contributions. The key point in this
calculation, however, should not be lost. Within the Social Security system, the level of
contributions into the system is substantially divorced from benefit calculations, creating an
opportunity for redistribution based on social policy considerations. This calculation and
consequent redistribution is also called into question in the “money’s worth” debate.
Specifically, each individual’s Social Security benefits are calculated by multiplying an average
of lifetime earnings (known as average indexed monthly earnings or AIME) by a fraction that
declines as average annual wages increase. For example, for individuals who first become
eligible for Social Security in 1998, the primary insurance amounts (on which all benefits are
based) are the sum of:

1.

Ninety percent of the first $477 of their average indexed monthly earnings.
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2.

Thirty-two percent of their average indexed monthly earnings over $477 and through
$2,875.

3.

Fifteen percent of their average indexed monthly earnings over $2,875.

It is this calculation that causes low-income beneficiaries generally to receive higher rates of
return than high-income beneficiaries. The dollar amounts demarcating the ranges to which the
percentage apply are commonly referred to as the “bend points” of the primary insurance amount
formula. They are adjusted annually by an index of average wages and are available from the
Social Security Administration (www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA.misc.html).

How Social Security Redistributes Wealth
By Marital Status and Gender
Beneficiaries receive different returns from Social Security based on gender and marital status.
Under Social Security, married couples generally do better than single individuals. For example,
as shown in exhibit 3.3, the average-wage, one-earner couple has the highest rate of return at
4.31 percent, whereas the average-wage single male and female have rates of return of 1.59
percent and 2.56 percent, respectively. The rate of return declines more the further one looks out
in time.

The greater value of Social Security to married couples compared with single individuals is due
to the availability of spousal and survivor benefits. Spouses are eligible for the greater of any
benefit they earn on their own and the amount they are entitled to as spouse (or surviving
spouse). The surviving spouse of a one-earner couple may be the nonworking spouse who is
eligible to continue to draw benefits based on the deceased spouse’s earnings record. The
contributions to the system by the one-earner couple provide benefits in excess of the return to a
single individual whose returns would stop at his or her death. This also helps to explain why
one-earner couples receive a greater return than two-earner couples.
The availability of spousal benefits diminishes the relative value of Social Security benefits for
two-earner couples relative to one-earner couples—particularly when there is a significant
disparity between spouses’ incomes. If the spousal benefit is larger than the benefit based on the
surviving spouse’s earnings record, the surviving spouse’s earnings have earned no return. When
the surviving spouse’s earnings record provides a greater benefit, the rate of return is reduced by
the additional contributions made by the surviving spouse and the “net” benefit is only the
increase in the benefits over what would have been received as a spousal benefit. This creates a
lower rate of return, as indicated by the 2.07 percent return for average- and high-wage, twoearner couples, as shown in exhibit 3.3.
Among single individuals, females on average generate larger returns than males because of their
longer life expectancy. This longer life expectancy allows benefits to be drawn for a greater
period of time based on the same level of contributions. This point is exemplified by the 1.59
percent return to average-wage single males and 2.56 percent return to comparable females, as
indicated in exhibit 3.3.
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Exhibit 3.3

Impact of Social Security on Wealth for
Average-Income Beneficiaries Turning 65 in the Year 2000
Net Transfers
($)

Rates of Return
(%)

-14,092

1.59

19,831

2.56

119,418

4.31

Two-earner couple (low and average wage)

67,319

3.11

Two-earner couple (average and high wage)

7,025

2.07

Average-wage single male
Average-wage single female
Average-wage one-earner couple

Source: Steuerle and Bakija, Retooling Social Security, tables A-6 and A-9.

By Income

Although there is a good deal of variation by household status, low-income single individuals do
much better than their high-income counterparts. For couples, rates of return are always higher
for low-income households than high-income households. The contributions into the system are
at a fixed rate based on the employee’s earnings, whereas benefits are calculated using only 15
percent of average indexed monthly earnings over $2,875. This creates a lower rate of return as
income increases, as illustrated in exhibit 3.4. Income tax paid on Social Security benefits
received further reduce the rates of return for higher income recipients.
Exhibit 3.4

Impact of Social Security for Low-, Middle-, and
High-Income Beneficiaries Turning 65 in the Year 2000
A. Real Rates of Return
Low Income
(%)

Middle Income
(%)

High Income
(%)

Single male

2.02

1.15

-0.07

Single female

2.77

2.05

0.81

One-earner couple

4.39

3.54

2.39

B. Net Social Security Transfers (in dollars)

Low Income
($)

Middle Income
($)

High Income
($)

-487

-42,405

-193,569

Single female

25,124

-2,930

-136,837

One-earner couple

95,447

116,724

54,350

Single male

Source: Steuerle and Bakija, Retooling Social Security, tables A.6 and A.9.
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STRESS POINTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
So far the data presented have demonstrated four salient features of Social Security:

1.

Declining returns over time. In general, the rate of return per recipient in Social Security
has declined since its inception and it will decline further. In general, current Social
Security recipients have received a good deal from Social Security. As the average rate of
return declines, many, but not all, Social Security recipients will be getting a poor deal
from Social Security.

2.

Below-market returns. The average rates of return on Social Security will decline below
rates of return available in financial markets because Social Security is still largely a payas-you-go system. The poor investment performance of Social Security is separable from
the funding issue. Even if Social Security became a fully funded system, its rate of return
could not significantly improve unless the restriction to invest solely in U.S. government
securities were lifted (or unless taxes increased significantly).

3.

Married couples versus single individuals and one-earner couples. The spousal benefit
provides tremendous value at little or no cost. Even as Social Security rates of return are
projected to decline rapidly, one-earner couples are projected to receive a very beneficial
deal from Social Security in the future.

4.

Low-income versus high-income individuals. The formula for calculating basic benefits
guarantees that low-income households get a better return. As Social Security returns
decline generally over time and as privatization receives increasing consideration, the
redistribution aspects of Social Security are likely to receive increased attention.

FAIRNESS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Reform plans to privatize Social Security would move the program away from a pay-as-you-go
social insurance program and make it more like a defined-contribution pension plan. To the
extent the system moves in the direction of becoming a defined-contribution plan, there will be
less redistribution from high- to low-income individuals, less redistribution from single
individuals to married couples, and less redistribution from two-earner couples to one-earner
couples. In addition, assets used to prefund retirement benefits can include private securities, so
not only will rates of return equalize, they will in general tend to rise. Achieving the proper
balance between financial and social program goals will involve significant policy debate.

If Social Security becomes more like a defined-contribution plan and benefits are more closely
linked to contributions, the overall performance of the economy could improve, assuming there
is no increase in welfare funded by other general taxes. Since the reason for Social Security’s
original creation, poverty among elderly, still exists, this seems unlikely. However, if this were
the case, Social Security contributions become less like taxes and more like any other noncash
component of wages. Therefore, these mandatory contributions have a less adverse impact on
labor supply. Social Security reform can also help the economy by removing the disincentives to
save in the current system. Efforts at redistribution run exactly counter to privatization. For

32

exactly the same reasons that privatization helps the economy, redistribution tends to hurt
economic growth.

The critical policy considerations for Social Security are no different from those facing the
federal government as a whole: Efforts to share wealth almost always tend to reduce the overall
amount of wealth in the economy. There is no right answer. There is no certainty. The proper
balance in the tradeoff between helping low-income individuals and achieving economic growth
will depend on subjective social preferences for redistribution as well as the uncertain amount of
economic growth that might be sacrificed for any given amount of redistribution. Reform efforts
will also need to address the modern family and changes in social structure since Social Security
was enacted in 1935.
It is interesting to note that not even the staunchest advocates of privatization are advocating
elimination of government retirement programs. In a free-market economy, there would not be
any type of mandatory government pension program. By making contributions mandatory, there
is an implicit acknowledgment that government can play a role by forcing people to save for
their retirement when they might not otherwise do so, or that the government should force them
to save more than they might otherwise to increase the overall rate of capital formation in the
economy. For example, the government may be able to achieve economies of scale and minimize
administration costs. By compelling annuitization at retirement, the government can help
overcome the market failure of “adverse selection” that prevents the private annuity market from
broadening on its own. There may also be some paternalism as well: Some individuals left to
their own devices might not save enough for their own retirement, so government must
intervene.

33

Chapter 4
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE ECONOMY

SUMMARY

•

Social Security benefits currently comprise approximately 5 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). Over the next three decades Social Security benefits are expected to rise to
7 percent of GDP.

•

Social Security has a multitude of potential impacts on the U.S. labor market. Although
economists do not believe that Social Security taxes have had much impact on the overall
labor supply, Social Security taxes likely have had some impact on the labor supplied by
individuals for whom working is not a necessity. Moreover, Social Security benefit rules
seem to have had an impact on early retirements and on the amount of work performed
during retirement.

•

Increased saving is key to increased capital formation, productivity, and long-term
economic growth.

•

During start-up years, a pay-as-you-go retirement plan such as Social Security reduces
saving by plan participants. However, it is less certain that such retirement plans discourage
savings in mature years.

•

The current Social Security system may have some detrimental effect on national saving,
and some reforms have the potential to increase saving, but there is much uncertainty and
debate about the magnitude of these effects.

•

For privatization plans to increase saving, they must increase mandatory contributions so
that neither private savings by individuals are reduced nor deficits by the government
increased.

INTRODUCTION

The impact of Social Security on national saving receives much attention. Many families pay
more in Social Security taxes than they do in income taxes.1 Therefore, to the extent that taxes
affect employment, the payroll tax is more likely than the income tax to have a detrimental
impact. Most economists agree that stronger long-term economic growth is fueled by savings.
Just as some economists believe that the federal income tax hurts U.S. saving, others believe that
Social Security has historically been responsible for an anemic saving growth rate in the United

1 See Martin A. Sullivan, “Social Security Taxes: No Room to Grow?” Tax Notes 71, no. 1 (1 April 1996): 133-136.
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States. Just as many believe that the United States needs fundamental income tax reform to
increase saving and improve economic growth, so do many believe that fundamental
restructuring of the Social Security system can increase saving and improve economic growth.
This section provides an overview of the impact of the current Social Security system and
options for Social Security reform on labor supply and on saving.

LABOR SUPPLY
Social Security: Defined Contribution or Social Program?

Before analyzing the impact of Social Security on labor supply, it is important to determine the
nature of the payments into the Social Security system. If Social Security is a tax that pays for
social programs, like the income tax, standard economic analysis about the impact of taxes
applies. If, however, Social Security is a defined-contribution pension plan, Social Security
imposes no significant tax burden on employees. In this case, any potential impact of the payroll
tax is exactly offset by the value of benefits provided, and the Social Security payroll tax should
have no direct impact on labor supply. A defined-contribution plan bases benefits on
contributions made into an account for an individual participant, which is distinguished from a
defined-benefit pension plan in which a set level of benefits are paid over a period of years.
Benefits can offset contributions to varying degrees. At one extreme, for example, an employee
is required to deposit 10 percent of her salary into a defined-contribution retirement plan, and
this employee was planning to save at least 10 percent of her salary anyway. In this case, there
might be some minor burden due to possible restrictions on investment choices, but the
individual is largely unaffected by the mandatory 10 percent requirement. Therefore, this
requirement is unlikely to affect that individual’s decision to work.
Even in the case when an employee has no intention of saving, the mandatory 10 percent
requirement is unlikely to have anything like the impact of a 10 percent tax. The individual may
be a reluctant saver, but the required 10 percent saving has significant value. The only case when
a defined-contribution plan could affect labor supply in the same manner as a tax is the case
(probably of a younger employee) when there is absolutely no interest in the retirement plans.
Such an individual, who looks only at take-home pay when deciding whether to work, will not
make a distinction between a tax or a contribution to a retirement plan. In this case, all reductions
in take-home pay—whether taxes or pension contributions—have the same impact on labor
supply.
The current Social Security system is not like a defined-contribution plan. It is true that there is
some linkage between contributions and benefits, but these ties are often loose and rarely
understood by employees. It is generally true that the more one works the more one gets, but the
complexity of Social Security benefit computation blurs the relationships. Ideally, individual
employees (and analysts) would like to know what the tax net of benefit is for each additional
dollar of wages earned. If there is no change in benefits, the mandatory payment of 12.4 percent
of wages is for economic purposes fully equivalent to a 12.4 percent tax. In many cases,
however, the burden of additional taxes due to additional wages is offset by future benefits.
Moreover, in some cases, particularly in the early years of Social Security and for low-income
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workers, the tax burden net of benefits may have been positive: Mandatory payments into the
Social Security system may actually have resulted in a net subsidy for working.
For a variety of reasons, it is probably safe to conclude that under the current system, employees
for a large part look upon payments into Social Security as a tax and respond to them in a
manner similar to income taxes. First, people are uncertain (because of the well-publicized
financial difficulties of the Social Security system) about the availability of future benefits.
Second, younger workers in particular do not understand the possible link between contributions
and benefits; even when links exist, many workers can clearly see the burden of the Social
Security tax but have little or no knowledge of any additional benefits that result from working.
Taxes and Labor Supply in General

To the extent that the current Social Security system and proposed reforms do impose tax
burdens on individuals, what is the likely impact on labor supply? Social Security taxes reduce
aftertax wages and can be expected to reduce labor supply just like price reductions reduce the
supply of any commodity. In countering this “price effect,” however, there is also an “income
effect.” Individuals sometimes work more in response to lower wages because they desire to
maintain a certain standard of living. Thus, it is unclear from a theoretical perspective whether
increases in taxes on wages increase or reduce labor supply. The empirical evidence suggests
that changes in aftertax wage rates have little or no impact on the supply of labor by primary
workers (workers who bring in a significant portion of a family’s earnings). For example, studies
show that the labor supply of prime-age men is not sensitive to changes in wage or tax rates.2

For many individuals, however, working is not a necessity. For secondary workers, the amount
of labor supplied is much more responsive to the level of aftertax wage rates than it is for
workers who are trying to maintain a basic standard of living. This can be the case for second (or
third) earners in a household. A senior citizen with pension income can simply reduce
consumption (or bequests) rather than work. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that taxes affect
the supply of labor for certain individuals. Empirical studies also confirm that labor supply of
married women is responsive to changes in wage and tax rates.3
Therefore, any reform proposal that tightens the linkage between contributions and benefits, or
reduces labor-based taxes outright, can be expected to increase the supply of labor to some
degree. Increases in labor supply would increase overall economic growth. Generally, it is
difficult to measure the degree of response, historically, to a given policy change. Consequently,
it is difficult to predict the extent to which changes would increase labor supply. As noted,
whatever impact there is, it is likely there would be less effect on primary workers than on other
workers. As discussed below, the empirical evidence is much more pronounced for older
workers who are trying to decide whether to retire or remain in the workforce.

2 See the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security, Final Report of Technical Panel on Trends and Issues in
Retirement Saving (Washington, D.C., 1995).
3 See 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security (1995).
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Structural Effects of Social Security on Labor Supply
Several aspects of Social Security may affect labor markets in very specific ways. For example,
many employees of state and local governments are not required to participate in the Social
Security system, creating a strong incentive for these employees to get part-time jobs so that they
may qualify for Social Security in addition to their regular pension benefits.

The most important structural aspect of Social Security that affects the labor market are the rules
that apply to individuals over the age sixty-two. In general, the Social Security system poses a
complex array of choices to individuals age sixty-two and over that can have a large impact on
the decision to retire or semiretire. If an individual at age sixty-two is working, current
retirement benefits can be reduced or entirely eliminated (depending on how much is earned). On
the other hand, future benefits are likely to be increased, for two reasons. First, more earnings
(often at a higher-than-average rate) are included in the benefit calculation. Second, delayed
retirement credits are included in the benefit calculation. The delayed retirement credit increases
the benefit amount for certain individuals who did not receive benefits for months after reaching
age sixty-five. Delayed retirement credit increases apply for benefits beginning January or the
year following the year the individual attains full retirement age. The delayed retirement credit
increases benefits by a fraction of a percent based on increment months. Each month in which
the individual is at least full retirement age but not yet age seventy (age seventy-two if the
individual attained age seventy before 1984) and for which the individual is eligible but did not
receive a benefit is an increment month.
Whether continuing to work is beneficial depends upon the individual’s earnings history and life
expectancy, but in general Social Security provides a substantial incentive for retirement because
the present value of lost current benefits is not offset by the expected value of future benefits.

Social Security’s impact on retirement may not be limited to the outcomes of complex cost
benefit calculations. Even when, for example, the retiring senior understands Social Security is
not beneficial in terms of present-value analysis, the individual may want the current income and
therefore may be willing to take a loss to get benefits earlier. In addition, the two pivotal
retirement ages in Social Security—age sixty-two and age sixty-five—are important symbols
that establish norms of retirement behavior for the elderly.4 Older workers may feel that this is
the time they should retire, and many retirement plans are tied to Social Security in such a
manner that they provide even further financial incentives to retire at ages sixty-two and sixtyfive.
Studies show that the prospect of receiving Social Security encourages retirement at age sixtytwo, the age of first eligibility, but the size of the effect is uncertain. Many believe that increased
Social Security benefits (in combination with the expansion of private pension benefits) are a
major reason for the shift toward age-sixty-two retirement, but these studies also suggest that not
all of the historical increase in early retirements can be explained by Social Security.5
Furthermore, most previous research has found little evidence to suggest that even substantial
4 These possible effects are discussed in Eugene C. Steuerle and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st
Century: Right and Wrong Answers to Reform (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1994), 199.
5 See 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security.
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changes in the structure of Social Security would have much effect on the average retirement age
as long as benefits continued to be available at age sixty-two, but this evidence is in dispute.6
There is somewhat less dispute about raising the “early” retirement age from its current level of
sixty-two. Raising the early retirement age would probably have some positive impact on labor
force participation rates of individuals in their sixties. However, there could be some offsetting
impact through an increase in the disability rate for this age group.

SAVING
Introduction
Most economists agree that the key to long-term economic growth is saving. The vast majority of
funds necessary to purchase new equipment, new plants, new roads, and new technology comes
from saving. Without increases in saving, any increase in one type of investment (for example,
new machinery) must be at the expense of other types of investment (for example, technology or
training). With more capital, employees have more tools or skills that enable them to be more
productive. Productivity growth leads to higher wages and a higher standard of living.

The current U.S. saving rate is low not only by historical standards, it is also low in comparison
with other major industrialized countries. Many analysts believe the Social Security system is, in
part, responsible for the low level of savings in the United States. As is discussed elsewhere in
this report, this correlation focuses on older Americans and their reliance on Social Security for
retirement savings. It has likewise been hypothesized that workers under the age of fifty
probably do not have this same attitude of reliance on Social Security for retirement and,
therefore, the low savings rate does not appear to have the same negative, casual relationship that
once existed.

Before exploring these issues in more detail, there are two important concepts to note. First,
although a tendency in policy debates is to focus on personal saving by individuals, primarily in
the form of pensions and accounts with financial institutions, significant saving is done by
businesses (that is, retained earnings), state governments (that generate budget surpluses), and
foreign individuals and businesses investing in the United States. Second, saving can be negative
as well as positive. When consumer or government spending exceeds income, this is a drain on
funds available for capital investment. Therefore, from the standpoint of capital formation,
reducing indebtedness is just as important as increasing saving. Of course, a prime example of
dissaving (that is, the opposite of saving) is the deficit-prone federal government. Although
Congress and the President are currently taking credit for eliminating the budget deficit, the
deficit still exists. Currently, contributions into Social Security exceed benefits paid out. The
federal government uses a unified budget that nets the actual federal budget deficit against the
large Social Security surplus. In addition to the annual federal deficit, there is the issue of the
accumulated national debt.

6 See 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security.
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The Impact of the Current Social Security System on Private Saving
Start-Up Period
During the start-up phase of any pay-as-you-go defined-benefit plan, the first beneficiaries
receive benefits that are large in comparison to their contributions. Similarly, the first
beneficiaries of Social Security and beneficiaries during the escalation of benefits in the 1960s
and 1970s received benefits that generally had actuarial values far in excess of their
contributions. In other words, their “net Social Security wealth” was positive. In fact, most past
and current beneficiaries have received more than they were actuarially entitled. Unfortunately,
future retirees are not expected to fare as well as their parents under Social Security. In the next
half century, increasingly larger numbers of retirees will have negative Social Security wealth.

Economic theory supports the notion that current retirees saved less than they otherwise might
have during their working years because they knew Social Security would be there for them
when they retired and they had not anticipated the impact of high inflation during the 1960s,
1970s, and early 1980s. In addition, current retirees probably reduced saving during their
working years by more than their contributions into the Social Security system. For example, if
an individual contributed on average 5 percent of his or her income to the Social Security
system, his or her savings would decline by more than 5 percent. This occurred because his or
her participation in the Social Security system resulted in the creation of net wealth and reduced
the need to save.

The Social Security system effectively went through two start-up phases: the first at its inception,
and the second in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when statutory increases in benefits far
outpaced inflation. Each statutory expansion of benefits resulted in an unexpected boost to net
Social Security wealth that was largest for those just about to retire before the expansion took
effect. It is important to remember that this phenomenon could not occur if Social Security were
a defined-contribution pension plan or a fully funded defined-benefit plan (see exhibit 4.1).
Exhibit 4.1

Average Annual Growth Rates in the Consumer Price Index
and Social Security Benefits, 1954-1996
Average Annual
Average Growth of
Growth Rate of Social Social Security Over
Security Benefits
Inflation

Time Period

Average Annual
Inflation

1954-67

1.8

2.1

0.3

1968-74

4.9

9.3

4.4

1975-96

5.6

5.6

-0.1

Sources:

1998 Economic Report of the President (Table B-28) and Social Security Administration
(www.ssa.gov/history/history6.html).
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Mature System

In General
Social Security’s negative impact on saving during its start-up period has been widely discussed
and acknowledged by many. If this earlier reasoning is correct, then as we reach the period when
net Social Security wealth is negative, workers would be expected to increase saving. Therefore,
it should be the case that Social Security is currently increasing private saving above normally
expected levels. Suppose, for example, an individual now contributing 12 percent of wages to the
Social Security system would have saved 15 percent in the absence of Social Security. Under the
current system, that individual may save more than 3 percent of income because the 12 percent
contributed to Social Security is not an adequate substitute for private saving of 12 percent.

Forced Saving Versus No Saving
There are, however, several other factors that need to be considered when evaluating Social
Security’s current impact on saving. First, many individuals, particularly those with low
incomes, would have been unable to save in the absence of Social Security. Most low-income
individuals get their employee contribution to Social Security reimbursed through the
mechanism of the Earned Income Credit. Therefore, all that is “saved” on their behalf is the
employer contribution. In these cases, and to the extent Social Security is prefunded,7 Social
Security could be forcing saving that otherwise would not occur.

Uncertainty—Annuitization and Disability Insurance

Besides saving to increase retirement consumption and bequests, individuals also save for
unpredictable or uncertain future hardships. This is the “precautionary motive” for saving. Social
Security’s disability insurance means that individuals do not have to save as much for a “rainy
day.” Also, because Social Security benefits are paid out in monthly annuity payments until
death, individuals have less of a need to “oversave” for the possibility of living past normal life
expectancy. Both of these features of the current Social Security system contribute to a lower
rate of personal saving than otherwise might be the case.

It is important to recognize that annuitization of benefits is a uniquely positive economic aspect
of Social Security. Although it is almost always the case that the private sector produces better
economic outcomes than the government, the market for annuities is an important exception to
that general rule. Currently, the private market for annuities is very thin. Further, it is unlikely
that an annuity market could develop in the future—even if Social Security were privatized. This
is due to the “adverse selection” problem. Individuals almost always have better information
about their own life expectancy than insurance companies. Also, insurance companies are not
permitted to discriminate based on such factors as life expectancy. Therefore, insurance
companies would not be able to charge individuals with short life expectancies differently than
they would those expecting to live longer. Any average pricing of these annuities will only drive
7 Currently, about 17 cents out of every dollar of contributions into the Social Security system is put into the trust
fund. So 17 cents of every dollar of Social Security tax is saved.
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out individuals with shorter life expectancies and encourage entry by individuals expecting to
live a long time.
Uncertainty—Underfunding

There has been much discussion in public about Social Security “going broke” and that there will
be no funds available for future benefits when today’s young workers retire. As discussed earlier,
the Social Security system faces a significant underfunding problem. Nevertheless, the
perception that Social Security benefits will be unavailable or much diminished provides a major
incentive for current workers to save more—whatever the reality.

Social Security Surplus Masks Federal Government Dissavings
As noted above, national saving includes both public and private saving. The current excess of
government expenditures over revenues means that saving by the federal government (not
including the Social Security trust fund) is negative. It is customary in economic analysis of a
government policy to assume that all other government programs are held constant except the
policy being altered. However, it would be unrealistic, and potentially misleading, to neglect the
impact of changes in Social Security on the federal deficit. The potential for any accumulation in
the Social Security trust fund to affect government actions was recognized at the inception of the
program and was indeed a major reason for a pay-as-you-go approach to Social Security
financing. It was recognized early on that the massive accumulation of funds would provide a
ready market for government debt, tax cuts, and spending.

Of course, it is outside the realm of economic prediction to assess how current and future
Congresses and Presidents might respond to any accumulation in the Social Security trust fund
after a reform plan is enacted. However, now the Social Security surplus does have a significant
impact on the overall federal deficit. Without the current Social Security surplus, the President
and Congress would not be able to claim they have balanced the budget. There can be little doubt
that the current focus of fiscal policy would be on deficit reduction and not on spending increases
and tax cuts were it not for the current Social Security surplus.

Summary of Savings Issues
There are a myriad of factors to consider when trying to assess the impact of Social Security on
saving, but certain conclusions do emerge:
•

Any detrimental effects of Social Security on saving are probably now much diminished
because the system does at least partially prefund benefits (improving public saving) and
individuals need to save more because Social Security benefits will not generate as high a
return as they have in the past. It is likely that Social Security did have some negative
impact on national saving in prior years, when Social Security was starting up and when it
was rapidly increasing benefits without any prefunding. This occurs because the Social
Security system provided benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis (so there was no public saving)
and individuals did not need to save because they could depend on Social Security (so there
was no private saving).
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Prefunding of Social Security benefits can have a significant positive impact on national
saving as long as federal deficits do not increase in response.
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Chapter 5
SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE STOCK MARKET

SUMMARY
•

Many proposals for Social Security reform include some prefunding of retirement benefits
with a portfolio of assets that includes private equities. Other proposals remove restrictions
so the trust fund could include equities; still others allow (or require) individuals to invest
in their own accounts, which could include private equity.

•

Over long periods of time, the return on investment in the stock market greatly outperforms
the return on U.S. government securities. Historically, the premium on the rate of return on
stocks over bonds has been about five percentage points.

•

Stocks are riskier than bonds. Even adjusting for risk, higher returns are available on stocks
than government bonds.

•

Although investment in the stock market would improve the financial condition of the
Social Security trust fund, it is not likely to have a significant positive impact on the overall
economy. It would give a more accurate allocation of rate of return and saving throughout
the economy. It would also increase the government’s cost to borrow funds, as Social
Security receipts invested in the stock market would no longer be available for belowmarket-rate borrowing by the government.

•

Many are concerned there could be undue political influence on investment decisions if the
Social Security system included investment in private companies. In addition, there could
be significant administrative costs associated with managing a diverse investment portfolio
(particularly if there are individual accounts). Both of these concerns are significant but
probably manageable.

INTRODUCTION

If the Social Security trust fund were to invest in private equities instead of government bonds,
the long-term rate of return would likely increase to reflect the greater riskiness of private equity
relative to federal debt. At first this almost appears to be “free money.” True, if an investment
portfolio of the Social Security trust fund could earn higher returns the financial condition of the
trust fund would improve, but most observers agree that there would not be an improvement to
the overall economy. However, this shift in investment assets would give a more accurate
allocation of return and saving throughout the economy. The general fund is being artificially
subsidized by the Social Security trust fund making funds available to the general fund at a
below-market rate (even for risk adjustment). Increased demand for equity and reduced demand
for government debt by the trust fund is expected to reduce returns on (or raise the price of)
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equity and increase returns of (or reduce the price of) debt. Any reallocation of risk and return
caused by investment of Social Security trust funds in the stock market needs to be carefully
evaluated, but there can be little doubt that a less conservative investment policy deserves serious
consideration.

RATES OF RETURN
The Real Return on Government Securities

Under current law, reserves of the Social Security trust fund are required to be invested in
interest-bearing obligations of the federal government. At the end of January 1998, the Social
Security trust fund had accumulated a balance of more than $666 billion. Almost all of the
“special issue” securities are available only to the trust funds. (A relatively minuscule portion of
the Social Security trust fund comprises marketable securities issued by the Treasury.) Special
issue securities comprise both short-term certificates of indebtedness ($69 billion) and longerterm bonds with maturities between one and fifteen years ($597 billion).1 The Secretary of the
Treasury is the managing director of the trust fund, and the Treasury may redeem special-issue
bonds at any time before maturity. In 1997, the average rate of interest on trust fund investments
2
was 7.5 percent.

Analysts usually break down interest rates into three parts: The inflation component, the risk
factor, and the “real” return on investment. The real interest rate is the difference between the
market (or “nominal”) rate of interest and the current inflation rate. (This is itself only an
estimate because, theoretically, the real interest rate is the difference between the nominal rate of
interest and the expected future inflation over the expected life of the bond.) The risk factor for
government securities is generally assumed to be zero. If Social Security funds were invested in
private securities, higher returns would be expected to compensate for higher risk. Although
inflation plays an important role in projections of the financial condition of Social Security, the
impact of the real interest rate is much more significant in economic projections. The Social
Security Administration (SSA) estimates that a one-percentage-point increase in the real interest
rate would push back the estimated exhaustion date of the trust fund by approximately two
years.123
Based on an average of the post World War II historical experience, the SSA estimates that the
future real return on the trust portfolio of government securities will be 2.3 percent. In its review
of this estimate, the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security was split in its
recommendation on real interest rates. Some panel members believe saving rates will continue to
be low and that real interest rates will be somewhat higher than the postwar average and,
therefore, preferred an estimate of 2.8 percent. Some economists expect a privatized Social
Security system to increase the overall rate of saving and therefore reduce the rate of interest
generally on all investments. A separate but related issue is the replacement of private stocks for
1 Data are from the Social Security Administration Web site (www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/invest ).
2 Data are from the Social Security Administration Web site (www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/effectiveRates).
3 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security, Final Report of Technical Panel on Trends and Issues in
Retirement Saving (Washington, D.C., 1995), 162.
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public bonds, which is likely to increase the price (and reduce the return) on stocks and at the
same time reduce the price (and increase the return) on government securities.4 Other panelists
believe the U.S. savings rate will return to early postwar levels (when real interest rates were
lower than average) and favor maintaining the 2.3 percent level recommended by the SSA.5
The Real Return on Equity
Historical experience clearly shows the return on stocks, on average, is much higher than the
return on government securities. There are some minor differences among analysts in
methodology, but the general consensus is that the real rate of return of private equity over time
is approximately 7 percent. Accordingly, the SSA estimates that investment in private securities
would yield a real rate of return of approximately 4.7 percentage points higher than investment in
government securities.6

Although these substantially higher returns are attractive, there is considerable concern about the
increased risk and volatility of returns on stock. Stocks have much more volatile returns than
government securities: The volatility of U.S. government bonds, as measured by the standard
deviation of those returns, is only 40 percent of the return on stocks.7 This is because government
bonds pay fixed interest and principal and government securities are free of default risk.
Government bonds are, however, subject to significant interest rate risk and inflation risk,
particularly longer-term bonds. So it is not accurate to say that government bonds are risk free.
Recently, the Treasury Department has begun to issue bonds whose interest payments are
indexed to the rate of inflation. These bonds are less risky (and pay less interest) than other
government bonds because they are not subject to inflation risk.
The other looming question—separate from the volatility issue—is whether stocks can continue
to outperform bonds at the same pace in the future. There is no easy answer to this question.
Proponents of Social Security investment in private stocks point to the current meteoric rise of
the U.S. stock market as evidence that even the five-percentage-point differential may be too
conservative. On the other hand, critics of privatization proposals point out that the Japanese
stock market has suffered enormous declines in the 1990s with no indication that it can soon
return to its prior lofty levels.
Several analysts and commentators have reasoned that if a Social Security reform plan
incorporates a private equity investment strategy, the rate differential between government bonds
4 Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits”
(NBER Working Paper 6055, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997).
5 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security, Final Report of Technical Panel on Trends and Issues in
Retirement Saving, 162-163.
6 A typical method of calculating these returns is to calculate the geometric mean (that is, taking into account the
effect of interest compounding) of the Standard & Poors 500 over a period from 1926 through 1993. Sometimes a
simple arithmetic mean is calculated, and when this is done the difference in interest rates between private stock and
government securities is not 5 percent, but closer to 7 percent. As a matter of mathematics, the lower geometric
average provides a more accurate reflection of market performance over long periods of time.
7 David W. Mullins, “Trust Fund Accumulation: How Much? How Managed?” in Social Security: What Role for the
Future, edited by Peter A. Diamond, David C. Lindeman, and Howard Young. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Social Insurance, 1996
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and private equities will be narrow.8 This is a straightforward application of basic economic
theory. With a total fixed supply of saving, an increase in demand for corporate equities
increases the price of these equities (and reduces their return). An increase in demand for stocks
causes a one-for-one reduction in demand for bonds and, therefore, a reduction in the price of
bonds (and an increase in their returns). If the Social Security trust fund invested in the private
equity market with a higher market yield, it would theoretically increase the yield on the trust
fund’s investment in the debt market. Although the theory is straightforward, there is no
empirical information on the magnitudes of rate-of-return compression between stocks and
bonds. The issue is further complicated by the possibility of corporations issuing more equity
and less debt as a result of the shift in the trust fund’s portfolio.
RISK
If the Social Security trust fund invested substantial portions of its portfolio in the stock market,
the volatility of returns would increase. Proponents of equity investment by the trust fund believe
that the substantial increase in expected returns is worth the increased risk. Social Security
actuaries, for example, have assumed that the inflation-adjusted, average long-term rate of return
on corporate equities is 4.7 percentage points higher than the corresponding rate of return on
government bonds. Some studies have shown that if the historical relationship between return on
private equities and return on government bonds is maintained, there is only an infinitesimal
chance that the return on trust fund assets would decline under any reallocation of investment
from government bonds to equities.9
Reallocation of risk between government and beneficiaries. It is important to distinguish between
risks faced by individuals in the system and risks to the overall financial soundness of the
system. For example, if the Social Security system were to invest in the stock market without any
changes in benefits, there would likely be increased volatility in the return of the Social Security
trust fund, but individual beneficiaries would be insulated from that risk because government
obligations have not changed.

Riskiness of the underlying portfolio. The degree of risk in any plan to increase Social Security
investment in the stock market depends on the timing of the portfolio shift and the underlying
investment guidelines of the new portfolio. Social Security trust fund investment in the stock
market generates many questions on how and if such a plan can be implemented.
•

What percentage of Social Security assets should be invested in equities? Academic
proposals often implicitly assume 100 percent investment in equities. More realistic
proposals often advocate gradual investment in equity until a target level of between 40
percent and 60 percent is achieved.

8 See, for example, Alan Greenspan, Remarks on Social Security at the Abraham Lincoln Award Ceremony of the
Union League of Philadelphia, 6 December 1996, and Randall P. Mariger, “Social Security Reform: What It Can
and Cannot Accomplish” (presented to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 1997).
9 See, for example, Martin Feldstein, “Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic Welfare?” (Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995).
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•

What are the investment guidelines for Social Security trust fund equity investments?
Should they specify just Fortune 500 companies or just stock traded on U.S. stock
exchanges? Will investment in non-publicly traded start-up companies be allowed? Will
investment in foreign companies and in foreign stock markets be allowed? Will investment
in corporate, municipal, and foreign-government bonds be allowed? Will investment in
non-dollar-denominated securities be allowed? Should arbitraging of equity investment
against government securities be allowed?

How these and other questions are answered determines the risk and return of the underlying
portfolio.

Change in risk due to shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plan. If Social Security
were privatized, it would in effect be transformed from a defined-benefit to a definedcontribution plan. Under a defined-contribution plan, benefits are more uncertain, even if all
investment of Social Security assets remained in government securities, because the beneficiaries
must now assume all investment risks. The riskiness of any defined-benefit plan depends on the
ability of the plan to guarantee benefits. One way of guaranteeing benefits is to fully fund the
plan. (Without full funding, the participants in defined-benefit plans must depend on their
contractual rights, the financial soundness of the plan sponsor, and the commitment of the plan
sponsor to meet its obligations. This will be discussed under the heading Political Risk.) Any
plan that increases the prefunding of Social Security benefits reduces risk to the extent that there
are concerns that the Social Security system and the federal government will not be able to fund
benefit levels in the long run.

Change in risk due to change in character of benefits. From each individual’s perspective, the
amount of acceptable risk in any reformed Social Security system will depend on the type of
benefits that result. There are possible changes in benefits that could change the nature of risks
faced by individual beneficiaries in the Social Security system. For example, Social Security
indexes retirement benefits to changes in inflation. In any plan in which inflation indexing is not
an element, inflation risk is reallocated to beneficiaries from the government. As another
example, consider allowing individuals the option of paying out benefits in the form of a lumpsum payment instead of an annuity. This clearly is a benefit in terms of increasing beneficiaries’
options, but there is certainly increased risk that a long-lived or high-consumption individual will
outlive or outspend the stream of payments that can be funded from a lump-sum distribution.
Differences in individuals’ risk management. Investment in private equities in any Social
Security reform could take the form of (1) investment in private securities by the Social Security
trust fund, (2) investment accounts in which individuals are given a limited set of investment
options in publicly managed funds, or (3) investment accounts in which individuals have little or
no restrictions on their investment and payout options. Although reform plans that include
investment in private securities may allow generally superior benefits to participants, those that
provide separate accounts may not be appropriate for all individuals. For example, for lowincome households, Social Security may be the only form of retirement saving, life insurance,
and disability insurance. Increased risk may be attractive to a high- or even middle-income
household, but it may not be tolerable to a low-income household with limited investment
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options. In the plans that offer investment options, some individuals may be unduly or even
irresponsibly aggressive in their investment choices.10
Political risk under the current system. Given the actuarial underfunding of Social Security,
future recipients in the system, particularly those under age thirty-five, face increased risk of
their benefits being reduced. Underfunding can be alleviated by payroll tax increases,
government borrowing, inflows of general tax revenues into the Social Security fund, or
increases in the rate of return on Social Security assets. In the end, however, beneficiaries are at
the mercy of the political process. Investment in private securities can reduce political risk in two
ways. First, to the extent that the return on assets can be increased, prefunding of benefits
increases, and therefore the likelihood of political interference decreases. Secondly, to the extent
that investment in private securities coincides with ownership of individual accounts, the
government’s role in Social Security will be reduced.

Political dynamics of a large trust fund. One of the major arguments put forward by advocates of
pay-as-you-go financing against prefunding of Social Security benefits is that the existence of a
large Social Security surplus would provide too much political temptation to increase Social
Security benefits or increase other social spending. Currently, the Social Security trust fund has a
large surplus, and while legally separate funds, the Social Security surplus is routinely used to
offset the federal deficit, so politicians can claim the overall federal budget is in balance. Current
actuarial estimates indicate that the Social Security trust fund would need to have a current
excess balance of between $1 trillion and $2 trillion dollars to pay anticipated future benefits. If
the trust fund were prefunded, interesting questions arise. Would the Social Security trust funds
of $2 trillion be left untouched? Even if Social Security funds were insulated, legislatively,
would Congress use other tools, such as the income tax law, to affect beneficiaries?
Political dynamics of a volatile trust fund. One major issue is how Congress will evaluate Social
Security after any reform plan is enacted into law. For example, almost any plan that is balanced
over the seventy-five-year horizon, as estimated in the year of enactment, will be out of balance
in years after enactment even if projections are 100 percent accurate. How politicians and the
general public will react to a moving target is unclear. A Social Security trust fund subject to the
volatility of the U.S. stock market is an even more difficult situation for politicians and the
public. What would happen if, as in the 1970s, the stock market languishes for a decade
immediately after enactment of a new plan to invest trust fund assets in corporate equity? Could
politicians sit tight as the trust fund’s financial condition worsened? Might there be political
pressures to increase trust fund balances, or perhaps even to revise the investment strategy?
Conversely, if the stock market does better than expected, will there be increased pressure for
benefit increases and payroll tax cuts, or perhaps an acceleration of investment of trust fund
assets into the stock market?

10 For a discussion of how individuals might invest mandatory accounts under their own control, see Joel Dickson,
“Analysis of Financial Conditions Surrounding Individual Accounts” (presented to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council
on Social Security, Washington, D.C., 11 April 1995).
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ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

Cost of administration is an important factor in determining the net return of any pension plan,
especially in Social Security reform, because the many possible outcomes depend on the reform
plan’s features. The administrative costs of the current Social Security system are considered
low. In 1997, they were $3.4 billion, equal to approximately 0.5 percent of assets.11 As a
percentage of assets, Social Security’s costs are approximately one-quarter those of private
pensions. Of course, one reason for higher costs of private pension plans is the additional
investment services provided by these plans. 12
An in-depth analysis of administrative costs performed for the Advisory Council on Social
Security considered a variety of options:
•

The Social Security trust fund invests in private equities, called the Maintenance of
Benefits Plan or “MB plan.”

•

Individuals had accounts that held indexed funds administered by the SSA, called the
Individual Accounts Plan or “IA plan.”

Under these options, administrative costs generally remained comparable to those incurred under
current law. Costs increased dramatically, however, when individuals hold accounts with private
funds that allow a wide range of investment options, such as the Personal Security Account Plan
or “PSA plan.” The three plans recommended by the Social Security Advisory Council are
discussed in greater detail later in this study. The assumptions used by the Advisory Council are
shown in exhibit 5.1.
Exhibit 5.1

Estimated Administrative Costs for the Social Security
Advisory Council’s Three Plans11
12
Administrative Costs
(as % of Assets)

Proposed Reform Plan
Maintenance of benefit plan. Basically the current
system with some stock market investment

0.005

Individual accounts plan. New individual accounts
(incurring additional recordkeeping cost) but funds
invested collectively

0.105

Personal security account plan. New individual
accounts with funds invested individually

1.000

Source: Joel Dickson, "Analysis of Financial Conditions Surrounding Individual Accounts” (presented to the
1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security, Washington, D.C., 11 April 1996).

11 Social Security Administration data at www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/t4a3Outgo.html.
12 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Social Security Privatization” (NBER Working Paper 5512, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1996).
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There are two main reasons for the significantly higher costs under plans with individual
accounts and unlimited investment options. First, recordkeeping costs (including costs of
postage, phone, statement and transaction processing, and account reconciliation) would be much
higher because they would no longer be incurred solely by the SSA. Second, although
investment services for passive index funds are inexpensive—perhaps ¼ percent to ½ percent per
year—the cost of an actively managed fund would almost certainly be as high as ½ percentage
point per year.13 Costs of diversified equity fund can easily exceed 1 percent (see exhibit 5.2).

Exhibit 5.2
Administrative Cost Ratios of Investment Fund, as of February 26, 1996

Category

Arithmetic
Weighted
Average
Average
(percentage points) (percentage points)

Total Assets
(in $ billions)

Diversified U.S. equity

1.36

.99

$865

Balanced

1.29

.84

$123

.91

.67

$113

1.08

.89

$138

Corporate bond

Government bond
Source:

See Dickson (1996).

The above costs are significant, but they are only average figures. As a percentage of assets,
administrative costs will be much larger for accounts with low balances than on average. Unless
there were some cross-subsidization from large accounts to small accounts, costs of servicing
and of individualized investment management might be prohibitive for smaller accounts. It is
therefore likely that certain high-cost services could be provided only for accounts that have
certain minimum balances.

OTHER ISSUES
Positive Impacts of Higher Returns Depend on Size of Reserve

If Social Security were to remain a pay-as-you-go system, investment strategies would not play a
major role in determining the overall structure of the system. Conversely, if Social Security
reserves were to be boosted above current projections, the importance of investment strategy will
become greater. The larger the Social Security trust fund, the greater the financial leverage from
higher returns. Several analysts have noted this, and they have advocated reform plans that
include temporary tax increases (or benefit reductions) to build up reserves coupled with
investment in equities to restore financial soundness to the system. Feldstein and Samwick have
advocated this in their plan designed around a system of individual accounts.14 Bosworth has
proposed temporary tax increases coupled with a more aggressive investment strategy within the

13 Dickson, “Analysis of Financial Conditions.”
14 Feldstein and Samwick, “The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits.”
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current structure of Social Security.15 In the long run, tax increases, benefit cuts, or both, can be
held to a minimum if lawmakers can bear the political fallout of the short-term sacrifice that
would be required to build reserves quickly.

Should the Social Security System Borrow to Invest in Equities?

It follows that if Social Security can earn more by investing in equities, why not allow Social
Security to increase its investment by borrowing—particularly if it can borrow at the low rates of
interest typical for federal bonds? The proposition of arbitraging investment in equities against
government securities is a financier’s dream, and it would be a money machine for the Social
Security system. One reason for its appeal is that such a plan does not take into account the
implicit cost of the government-backed debt. The federal government should charge a risk
premium to any borrower using its funds. Equities are hardly-risk free, and even though in the
long run, equities should outperform government securities, they may not over the short run, and
therefore the federal government would be left responsible. The federal government should
charge a price for assuming this risk. Even if the equity returns are always sufficient to pay back
debt, it must be recognized that the Social Security system will face enormous risks. Equity
investment is risky. Leveraged investment in the equity market is far riskier—it may be deemed
too risky.
There is a second reason to take pause about leveraging Social Security investment. If the Social
Security system were allowed to borrow to invest in the stock market, there would be no limits
on government’s ownership of private capital and its ability to crowd out private investors.
One useful benchmark of comparison for any Social Security privatization plan is the Federal
Employees’ Retirement System, which is discussed in exhibit 5.3.

Impact on the Rest of the Economy
Most economists conclude investing in private securities would probably have no appreciable
impact on the overall economy. This is because such an investment represents a reallocation of a
fixed amount of overall total return on capital in the economy from current stock market
investors to trust fund beneficiaries. It also reallocates risk from current investors to Social
Security. In the short run—as the markets digest any such changes—returns on stock would rise
while returns on bonds would decline, but over the long term—as the market adjusts—returns on
stocks would probably fall and interest rates would probably rise.

Stock market investment is good for Social Security, but not necessarily for the economy. If
Social Security reform benefits the economy, it will likely stem from possible increases in net
national saving. Social Security reform might also improve economic performance by increasing
labor supply through either reducing taxes directly or reducing the net burden of taxes by
increasing the link between benefits.

15 Barry Bosworth, “Trust Fund Accumulation: How Much? How Managed?” in Social Security: What Role for the
Future, edited by Peter A. Diamond, David C. Lindeman, and Howard Young. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Social Insurance, 1996.
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Exhibit 5.3

Is the Federal Employees’ Retirement System a Model for Social Security Privatization?
The Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) is a defined-contribution retirement plan that
covers over two million employees of the federal government. Once an individual is employed for a
minimum period, these funds are not forfeitable. Participants may choose among several passively
managed funds. Participants who opt for fixed-income or equity securities funds are required to sign
an acknowledgment that the government does not protect them from loss. Individuals who do not
make an election automatically have their funds invested in the Thrift Savings Fund, a government
securities fund controlled by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board and an executive
director appointed by the board. The board members and the executive director must have
substantial expertise in investment management and must discharge their responsibilities solely for
the benefit of plan participants.
By all accounts, FERS appears to be a small, well-run federal agency. Participants have a range of
investment options that offer market rates of return and risk diversification at low cost. There is no
perceptible political influence on portfolio choices made by FERS. FERS trust fund receipts are not
counted as receipts of the federal government, so they cannot be used to mask the size of the
federal deficit. Thus, FERS has many features that would be attractive components of any Social
Security privatization plan. There are, however, two important features to take into account if FERS
were used as a model for Social Security privatization. First, within FERS there is no redistributive
element as currently exists within Social Security—either within generations or across generations.
If a FERS-like plan were adopted, some provision within or outside the plan might need to be made
for low-income elderly and for beneficiaries under the current Social Security system whose
benefits are underfunded.

The second major issue in using FERS as a model for Social Security reform is that the FERSsystem is premised on the existence of Social Security. There is no need for FERS to concern itself
with poverty because Social Security already lifts nearly all of its participants above the poverty
level. Also, FERS participants receive an inflation-indexed annuity with benefits insulated from
fluctuation in the prices of investment assets. If a FERS-like plan were substituted, in whole or in
part for the current Social Security system, participants in the new FERS-like plan (as well as the
existing FERS plan) would likely hold portfolios significantly more conservative (in terms of both risk
and liquidity) than those in the portfolios of current FERS investors.
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Chapter 6
OPTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM

SUMMARY

•

There are three general methods of improving the financial condition of the Social Security
trust fund: (1) reductions in benefits, (2) increases in revenues, and (3) improving the rate
of return on assets in the Social Security trust fund.

•

A reduction in benefits can be accomplished through across-the-board cuts, means-testing,
or raising the retirement age.

•

Increasing the payroll tax rate and extending the payroll tax to all government workers will
produce greater revenue for the trust fund. Raising the income tax on Social Security
benefits and use of general tax revenues would also improve the financial condition of the
Social Security trust fund.

•

Proposals to improve the rate of return on assets fall into two categories: (1) plans that
involve only minor restructuring but allow the trust fund to invest in equities; and (2) plans
that would create new individual accounts that could include investment in equities.

•

Investment in equity involves increased risk. The degree to which individuals should face
increased risks will be a central issue in the debate on Social Security reform.

INTRODUCTION
The United States is about to engage in a major debate about Social Security reform. Catalysts
for the debate are the annual reports from the Social Security Administration (SSA) informing
Americans that Social Security—historically the largest source of retirement benefits—will
likely not have sufficient resources to fund scheduled retirement benefits in the future,
particularly for those now under the age of forty. Social Security is often described as the most
popular government program, and Americans collectively have come to rely on Social Security.
Inadequate funds do not mean zero benefits. In some ways the public’s concerns are overstated.
Many believe that the Social Security trust fund shortfall means there will be nothing remaining
when they retire. As discussed earlier, under the SSA’s intermediate projections, full benefits
may be paid through the year 2032. Thereafter, approximately 75 percent of benefits may be
paid. This is not to downplay the degree of the problem. A 25 percent shortfall in promised
benefits for younger Americans when they retire is a serious issue, but it is far different from
saying they will accrue no benefits.
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The use of Social Security surpluses to mask federal deficits does not impair the financial
condition of Social Security. However, public fears about the soundness of Social Security have
fueled concerns about Social Security “being used to pay for current government deficits.”
Although the double counting of Social Security surpluses as trust fund saving and general
government revenue is not an acceptable accounting practice, it does not in any way impugn the
financial soundness of Social Security. A more appropriate accounting procedure would be to
eliminate Social Security surpluses from net government receipts when computing the current
government deficit. The federal government’s claiming funds explicitly reserved for retirement
saving as current receipts is misleading. Making a claim does not make it true. For example, a
resourceful teenager saved for college by working a part-time job. Now suppose the teenager’s
less resourceful parents spent more than they earned by borrowing the same amount as the youth
saves, and then claimed they were not in the red because of their child’s savings. This would not
threaten the soundness of the teenager’s accounts. It only means the parents are deceiving others
(and perhaps themselves) about their real financial status. Further, as scheduled annual benefits
start to exceed annual receipts, the federal government will start to repay borrowing from the
Social Security trust fund. Such repayment will increase future federal government budget
deficits.
While public perceptions about funding shortfalls may be overstated, it is interesting to note that
public dissatisfaction with Social Security is likely to grow, but the dissatisfaction has nothing to
do with insufficient funding. Suppose for a moment that Social Security had no funding
shortfall—that somehow, magically, all the “promised” benefits will be there at retirement.
There would still likely be increasing dissatisfaction. As discussed earlier, the inevitable result of
a pay-as-you-go system like Social Security is that first generations of beneficiaries receive a
higher rate of return and that the rate of return declines dramatically as the system matures.

Moreover, the rate of return of the mature system is likely to be low not only in comparison to
historical standards but also relative to other investments in the economy. This occurs for two
reasons: (1) To the extent Social Security is partially funded, it can generate only an average rate
of return equal to that available on federal government bonds; and (2) to the extent Social
Security is not prefunded, Social Security can pay only an average real rate of return equal to the
real growth rate of wages. As a result of substantial intergenerational redistribution, many
beneficiaries will earn a rate of return below this low average. None of this was true in the past:
Nearly all current beneficiaries of Social Security are receiving more than the actuarially
determined fair value of their benefits. This will not be true in the future.
Although financial soundness and money’s-worth issues are probably the driving forces behind
the Social Security debate, they are not the only issues. This section reviews and evaluates both
generic and specific options for Social Security reform with respect to their effects on the
financial soundness of the trust fund, individuals’ rate of return, economic growth, poverty of the
elderly, and on the intergenerational distribution of burdens and benefits of Social Security. It is
important to recognize that the discussion of simple, generic proposals is appropriate only for
expository purposes and should be applied to policy analysis with caution. Most real-world
proposals include a variety of features (for example, benefit cuts, equity investment, tax
increases, increased retirement ages, and income taxation of benefits), and a complete evaluation
of a specific proposal requires taking into account the simultaneous effects of all features of the
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proposal. We have not attempted to analyze other countries’ Social Security reform efforts or to
project their results into the U.S. situation. Economic, cultural, and social policy differences
make the international experience difficult to translate into domestic reform scenarios.

REDUCTIONS IN BENEFITS

Benefit Cuts
Benefit cuts can be immediate or targeted to future Social Security beneficiaries. If current
benefits were cut to approximately 70 percent of current levels, future shortfalls would be
avoided. Most current proposals do not contain benefit cuts for current or near-term recipients,
because the economic security of affected retirees would be reduced and some retirees would be
pushed below the poverty level. The groups that are most impoverished—African-Americans,
the very elderly, widows whose deceased spouses had low earnings—would be most adversely
affected. Other government welfare programs, such as food stamps and Supplement Security
Income (SSI), might mitigate the effects of reductions in Social Security benefits on the poor.
Any automatic or mandated increase in antipoverty programs would put new financial pressures
on federal, state, and local governments sponsoring these programs. Benefit cuts would also
reduce individuals’ rate of return on Social Security. For groups with an above-average rate of
return, such as the current elderly, married couples with one earner, and low-income individuals,
a benefit cut would bring the return on Social Security in line with other investments. For others
with below-average returns, however, such as future single retirees and future high-incomeearner retirees, any reduction in benefits would only exacerbate the rate-of-return problem.
However, benefit cuts would likely increase incentives to save and reduce incentives to retire
early. The resulting saving and labor-supply increases would help the economy, but the effects
may not be large. It should be noted that benefit cuts hurt all current and future retirees, but
because current retirees bear some of the burden, a benefit cut reduces some of the overall
financial burden of Social Security that current workers are now facing. It also reduces the
intergenerational wealth transfer.

Raising the Retirement Age
Under current law, the normal retirement age (NRA) is scheduled to increase gradually from age
sixty-five to age sixty-seven for those reaching age sixty-two in 2022. Perhaps the most
frequently discussed method of reducing benefits is an additional increase either in the NRA or
in the early retirement age (ERA), now age sixty-two, or in both. In many respects, these
proposals have similar effects to an across-the-board benefit cut: Financial soundness would
improve at the cost of a lower rate of return and higher poverty. In addition, depending on the
effective date and possible phase-ins, benefit cuts increase the relative burden on current
beneficiaries relative to current contributors, where there is the possibility of more saving. There
are some differences as well. It is likely that this change could increase the average retirement
age, directly through changes in Social Security and perhaps also indirectly, as employer pension
plans might also begin paying benefits later in response to changes in the Social Security rules.
However, there may be higher disability rates if the retirement ages are raised, as many health
problems assert themselves in the over-sixty age group.
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One important difference between across-the-board benefit cuts and an increase in retirement age
is the difference in distributional effects: Those with shorter life expectancies bear a
proportionately larger share of the burden. For example, African-Americans have higher early
death rates than do white Americans. Also, individuals who are less educated have higher early
death rates than highly educated individuals. One reason for this is that education is positively
related to healthy behaviors. For example, the rate of reduction in cigarette smoking has been
three times higher for those who have completed college than for those who have not completed
high school.1 The implication of all this is that any proposal to delay retirement age would place
a disproportionate burden on groups with shorter life expectancies.

Changes to Cost of Living Adjustments Increases

The Bureau of Labor Statistics is responsible for calculating the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
which is used to index Social Security benefits (generally computed at age sixty-two) to keep
pace with inflation. (The CPI is not used to index earnings to arrive at the average indexed
monthly earnings [AIME]). There has been much criticism that use of the CPI overstates the
impact of inflation on the cost of living, and many have proposed either ad hoc or technical
adjustments to the CPI to correct this error. (As a technical matter, there is much dispute about
the order of magnitude of any bias in the CPI. Some analysts believe it may be small, whereas
others believe it may be as large as 1.5 percentage points annually.)1
2 If modifications are made to
the CPI, as a practical matter it would be the equivalent of a phased-in, across-the-board
reduction of benefits with an increasingly negative impact on returns to Social Security for
younger and future Social Security beneficiaries. Inaccuracies in the CPI also affect other
government calculations.
Reduction of Benefits for High-Wage Workers

To improve Social Security’s financing without reducing benefits for those most in need, it is
sometimes suggested that any cutbacks in Social Security benefits be concentrated among
beneficiaries with high incomes. Perhaps the easiest method of cutting benefits for more affluent
Americans is to reduce high monthly benefits above a certain amount. This might be achieved,
for example, by reducing the replacement rate above the second bend point from its current level
of 15 percent to 10 percent. The problem with reducing benefits in this manner is that many
affluent Americans who receive low benefits will continue to receive benefits, while at the same
time many who receive above-average benefits but otherwise have no income may have their
benefits cut. Thus, this method is not well-targeted at achieving its main objective, protecting the
poor. In addition, by progressively reducing the rate of return on Social Security as wages
increase, the potential for adverse impacts on labor supply is proportionately greater than for an
across-the-board reduction in benefits.

1 Samuel Preston, “Ethnic and Social Differences in Mortality and Life Expectancy” (presented to the 1994-1995
Advisory Council on Social Security, 11 February 1995).
2 Alan Greenspan, Remarks on Social Security at the Abraham Lincoln Award Ceremony of the Union League of
Philadelphia, 6 December 1996.
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Means Testing of Benefits
Means testing of Social Security benefits is better suited to protecting poorer Americans against
cutbacks in Social Security. Means testing is achieved by taking into account total family
income, not just benefits. Although better targeted than simple reductions in high levels of
benefits, income is hardly a measure of well-being—particularly among the elderly. For
example, an elderly individual may have substantial wealth—including a personal residence—
but low current income. Means testing based on wealth is improbable because new
administrative systems must be developed (that is, the new system could not “piggyback” on the
income tax) and because of significant new compliance and valuation issues. Nevertheless, any
income-based means-testing would add significant new complexity to the relatively
straightforward administration of Social Security benefits. Even though the earnings test cuts
back benefits for workers with wages above a threshold, all the data to administer this test (that
is, current wages) is already in the Social Security system. Means testing reform also raises a
number of fairness issues such as treatment of savers versus spenders and treatment of earnings
from wages versus investments.

The economic problems caused by means testing are also significant. As with a reduction in high
levels of benefits, individuals would have less incentive to work because progressively greater
burdens are placed on net returns to Social Security as individuals earn more income during their
lifetime. In addition, net (after benefits) return on saving would also be reduced. The net impact
on saving is ambiguous because many high-income individuals may want to increase saving in
recognition of the reduced level of benefits available in retirement as a result of means testing.
Taxation of Social Security Benefits

The practical problems with means testing are probably why lawmakers are already using
taxation of Social Security benefits as a method of raising revenue for Social Security without
burdening the elderly poor. Social Security benefits were not subject to tax until legislation was
enacted in 1983. The taxation of Social Security benefits was further expanded in the legislation
that codified the 1993 budget agreement.3 Economically, taxation of Social Security benefits is
equivalent to means testing by income. Its major advantage over means testing is that high
incremental administrative costs are avoided by implementing means testing through the tax
system. (There may also be some political benefits in that Social Security per se is not being
reduced.) Given that the current taxation of Social Security benefits is already targeted at upperand upper-middle income households, expanded taxation of Social Security could have an
adverse impact on the lower-middle income elderly (since the lowest income households are not

3 Before 1984, Social Security benefits were not subject to income tax. Legislation enacted in 1983 subjected Social
Security benefits to tax beginning in 1984 if a taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income exceeded a 50 percent
threshold amount. The additional income tax revenues resulting from this provision are transferred to the Social
Security trust fund. In 1993 the taxation of Social Security benefits was expanded for taxpayers with combined
income exceeding a secondary threshold amount so that the amount of benefits subject to income tax was, in
general, increased from 50 percent of the benefit to 85 percent of the excess of the taxpayer’s combined income over
a secondary threshold. However, no more than 85 percent of the benefit amount is subject to income tax. The
additional income tax revenues resulting from the increase in the taxable percentage from 50 percent to 85 percent
are transferred to the Medicare trust fund.
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subject to income tax).4 One approach to improve fairness would be to tax Social Security
benefits in a manner similar to private pensions. Taxpayers would then pay taxes only on Social
Security benefits in excess of Social Security contributions. Another approach to improve
fairness would be to make Social Security contributions deductible in arriving at taxable income,
thereby eliminating the double taxation (that is, once, when earned and contributed to the trust
fund, and a second time, when Social Security benefits are received during retirement).
PAYROLL TAX INCREASES IN REVENUE

Increase in the Payroll Tax Rate

In general, a payroll tax increase improves the financial soundness of the Social Security trust
fund, but it also increases the labor market distortions of the payroll tax on labor supply and the
burden on current workers vis-a-vis current beneficiaries. Low- and moderate-income workers
may fall below the poverty line as a result of a payroll tax increase, particularly since the payroll
tax has no exemption amount or standard deduction. An increase in the payroll tax will cause the
rate of return of all workers currently paying into the system to decline. For some beneficiaries
with particularly high returns, such as low-income married couples with one earner, this change
would more closely align payments with the actuarial value of benefits. For others (for example,
high-income individuals and two-earner couples), a tax increase will only further reduce their
below-market rate of return. There has been a steady increase in the rate of the payroll tax used
to finance Social Security, but the current public and political sentiment appears to be hostile to
any further increases (see exhibit 6.1 )5.
Increase the Ceiling on Taxable Earnings

In 1998, only earned income up to $68,400 per individual worker is subject to Social Security
tax. (In 1990, the ceiling on the Medicare portion of the payroll tax was taken out of lockstep
with that of Social Security and raised to $125,000. In 1993, the ceiling was eliminated entirely
and now all wage and self-employment income is subject to Medicare taxes.) One way to
increase Social Security revenue would be to increase or entirely eliminate the ceiling on taxable
earnings. A related proposal would not only subject high earnings to tax, but subject them to a
higher rate of tax and thereby make the Social Security tax progressive, rather than regressive.
This type of payroll tax increase only affects high-wage earners. High-income individuals with
low-wage income would be unaffected. Also, this type of increase puts a disproportionate burden
on the wage-earning wealthy relative to the wealthy who earn investment income. This
discussion assumes that any increase in the taxable-earnings amount would not result in an
increase in benefits that would follow from mechanical application of the benefits formula.*3

4 According to preliminary data from the Internal Revenue Service, in 1996 approximately 9.73 million individual
tax returns—out of a total of 111.69 million—included taxable Social Security benefits. Filers of these returns
received $115.3 billion in benefits, of which $43.7 billion were included in adjusted gross income. See Shawn M.
Harwood and Maureen Keenan Kahr, “Individual Tax Returns, 1996: Early Tax Estimates,” Statistics of Income
Bulletin, (Winter 1997-1998).
3 Martin A. Sullivan, “Social Security Taxes: No Room to Grow?” Tax Notes 71, no. 1 (1 April 1996): 133-136.
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Exhibit 6.1
Social Security Tax Rates, 1937-2000 (and Beyond)

Source: 1998 Trustee’s Report, Table II.B.1 (www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98/triib.html#pgfld = 1023147).

Unlike means testing or other methods of reducing benefits for the wealthy, increasing the
payroll tax burden focuses the new burden on current, high-income workers and largely exempts
current high-income beneficiaries. Many would consider an increase in the payroll tax ceiling
particularly unfair given that future high-income beneficiaries—particularly single individuals
and two-earners couples—are already slated to receive the lowest rate of return ever paid out by
the Social Security system. It should also be noted that because most earnings, approximately 86
percent, are already subject to Social Security tax, the revenue potential of increased taxes on
high-wage earners is limited.
Use of General Tax Revenues

Given the existence of the current income-tax system, the use of general revenues to improve the
financial condition of Social Security has some attraction. Currently, income taxes on Social
Security benefits are already transferred directly to the Social Security trust fund. (Also, the Part
B portion of Medicare receives most of its funding from general revenues.) Looking purely from
within the system, the use of general revenues would increase the rate of return and could
increase the popularity of the program. On the other hand, many believe the use of general
revenues would erode support for the program because the use of general revenues pushes Social
Security one step away from being a retirement plan and one step toward a welfare program. Of
course, the higher rate of return is illusory because the additional funds come from higher tax
burdens. Given that the income tax is much more progressive than the payroll tax, any switch
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from payroll to income-tax financing of Social Security would generally increase the
progressivity of the U.S. fiscal system. However, given the versatility of the income tax, any tax
increase used to help finance Social Security could be targeted to keep the same overall level of
progressivity as under current law. It should be further noted that use of general revenues to fund
Social Security benefits takes funds from other programs, such as education and social programs
for younger segments of the population. Another twist on using general revenues would involve
rate of return on existing future borrowings from the Social Security trust fund. This alternative
would require the general fund to pay a “market rate of return” on funds borrowed from Social
Security.
Extend Social Security Coverage to All State and Local Government Workers

Currently, some employees of state and local government are not required to participate in Social
Security. Although the salaries paid by state and local governments to these workers are not
subject to employment tax, these workers may still be eligible for substantial Social Security
benefits at no cost because their spouses are participants. Alternatively, these workers may have
second or part-time jobs and thereby become eligible for relatively generous benefits paid to
low-wage earners even though they may have substantial wage income from their government
job. Requiring these workers to participate in the system would improve Social Security
finances. However, the amount of revenue that can be raised through this option is limited.
Whether or not this proposal would improve the fairness of the system depends on one’s views
as to what constitutes fairness. On the one hand, for workers who might otherwise be getting a
“bad deal” from Social Security, this exemption from mandatory participation allows these
workers some relief. On the other hand, many of these workers are not receiving poor returns and
the exemption comes at the financial expense of the Social Security system. In any case,
allowing just one set of workers some relief also may not be considered fair.

INCREASE RATE OF RETURN ON ASSETS IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND
Private Capital Markets
The potential benefits from investment in private capital markets by the Social Security trust
fund were discussed earlier. If historical returns can be realized in the future, the financial
condition of the system could be improved without reductions in benefits or tax increases.
Besides the obvious political appeal that would result from avoiding any reductions in already
declining rates of return, there is also the benefit of avoiding the economic distortions that
benefit cuts and tax increases entail.
There are, however, two major difficulties with investment in private capital markets. First is the
increased volatility of rates of return. Under a plan in which the Social Security trust fund invests
in equity, this volatility would not directly affect future beneficiaries (because there is no change
in statutory benefits); it just means that the probability of a need for later statutory adjustments in
benefits and payroll taxes is greater than it would be with investments in government securities.
The second issue is how a massive infusion of Social Security trust funds into the private equity
market would affect the markets. It is not anticipated that such a change would have any
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significant effect on the overall economy, but there could be a reduction in the difference in
average rates of return on stocks and bonds due to the large increase in demand for stocks and a
corresponding reduction in the demand for bonds.
Individual Accounts
In the current debate, the types of proposals that are receiving the most attention are those that
would privatize Social Security. A major attraction of some Social Security privatization plans is
visibility of benefits. Advocates of privatization are mindful of the political benefits of individual
accounts that beneficiaries would be able to identify, value, manage, and “own.” The worker
would have some discretion about investment options and perhaps even payout options. It is also
important to stress the economic, as well as political, benefits of making benefits more
immediately visible. The close link between contributions and benefits means that Social
Security would have fewer distortions on economic behavior under privatization. Economists
would say that Social Security would be more “neutral.” Among the most important issues to
consider under any privatization plan are the following:

•

To what degree, and over what period, would benefits under the existing system remain in
place? Current indications are that most new proposals for Social Security reform will have
some degree of privatization, so in many respects the differences between plans will be
only a matter of degree. Some privatization plans leave much of the current system in place
and then tack on a relatively small additional contribution to fund new individual accounts.
Some privatization plans bifurcate the current system: New individual defined-contribution
accounts are created but they also leave in place a significant defined-benefit component.
Even plans that would completely transform Social Security to a defined-benefit plan
would do so after a long transition period.

•

Will there be any safety net for low-income beneficiaries? The current Social Security
system redistributes benefits from high-income to low-income beneficiaries. There is little
room for redistribution in defined-contribution plans.

•

How much discretion will individuals have? Will accounts be mandatory or optional? Must
individuals annuitize benefits or can benefits be received in a lump-sum or under some
other method? With respect to investment options, will the individual be able to select from
a choice of index funds (as under the Federal Employees Retirement System) or will
individuals be able to choose investments more specifically (as they would with a private
investment manager)? This last question is particularly important because administrative
costs are much higher for any plans in which indexed funds are not used.

Many plans to privatize Social Security call for massive new government borrowing to fund
existing liabilities as the current system undergoes a “transition” to a new privatized system.
Current actuarial estimates indicate that the Social Security trust fund would need to have a
current excess balance of between $1 trillion and $2 trillion to pay anticipated future benefits.
Trillions of dollars of new federal borrowing is a somewhat daunting proposition. Such a
proposal would make the government’s current implicit obligation to participants in the Social
Security system an explicit obligation. The prefunding of benefits would be a major benefit to
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future beneficiaries. The burden of the debt would depend on the maturity structure of the debt
and who was responsible for its repayment. If the new debt would be repaid with general
Treasury funds, the burden of funding future Social Security will have been transferred from
workers in the system somewhat more broadly to future taxpayers. If the new debt is repaid with
Social Security funds, the comments of the previous paragraph apply: The federal government
and the Social Security system are assuming increased risk in the hope of shoring up the finances
of the Social Security system.6

In general, any movement toward a defined-contribution type plan will improve the individual’s
money’s worth because of the investment of at least some assets in high-yielding securities.
However, some beneficiaries particularly favored under the current system might be worse off.
Because a privatized system makes contributions to Social Security more like an employer
benefit than a tax, a privatized system probably has more potential than any other type of plan to
increase economic growth by increasing saving and labor supply. The magnitude of these
economic benefits is a subject of controversy. Furthermore, there is a trade-off between potential
economic benefits and the degree to which Social Security can redistribute income to the needy.
Defined-contribution plans—by their nature—do not allow redistribution. Defined-contribution
plans by design assign risk and responsibility for benefits levels and portfolio rate of return to the
plan beneficiaries. The risk and responsibility of Social Security future benefits rests squarely on
the shoulders of the federal government. As privatization versus Social Security is debated, a
critical question arises: Can or should the risk and responsibility for our entire population be
transferred to the private sector?

THREE PLANS RECOMMENDED BY THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY

The 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social Security released its report in January 1997, after
more than two years of deliberations. Instead of offering a single set of consensus
recommendations, the diverse thirteen-person panel presented three very different visions for the
future of the Social Security system. The Advisory Council’s recommendations are worthy of
note because of the quasi-official status of the group, the diversity of views, and the high quality
of the research and analysis supporting the proposals. All three of the plans are estimated to
restore the seventy-five-year balance, but the plans provide three very different visions for the
future of the Social Security system. Exhibit 6.2 compares the estimated change in the longrange Social Security actuarial balance (as a percentage of payroll) of the maintenance of
benefits (MB), individual accounts (IA), and personal security account (PSA) proposals included
in the Advisory Council’s report.

6 Thomas Jones, in “Trust Fund Investment Alternatives” (presented to the 1994-1995 Advisory Council on Social
Security, Washington, D.C., 1995), compares the prospect of Social Security borrowing to the current borrowing
programs of such government-sponsored agencies as the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)
and the Student Loan Marketing Association (“Sallie Mae”). Under new rules for federal budgeting, federal entities
granted borrowing authority that includes explicit or implicit federal guarantees must be charged an amount
equivalent to the reduction in borrowing cost (that is, the risk premium) that the entity enjoys as a result of this
borrowing.
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The Maintenance of Benefits Proposal
Of the three plans proposed by the Advisory Council, the MB plan involves the least structural
change. The plan eliminates the Social Security deficit without altering the basic nature of the
program. The system is brought into actuarial balance with a variety of old and new proposals,
including benefit reductions, tax increases, and investment of trust fund assets in equities.
Interesting, however, the plan does not include any mandatory increase in retirement ages.
Specifically, the MB plans includes the following:

•

Extending coverage to state and local government employees hired after 1997 who under
current law would not be covered by Social Security

•

Making Social Security benefits taxable to the extent that they exceed worker contributions
(this would make the program comparable to other contributory defined-benefit plans)

•

Lengthening the averaging period for the Social Security benefit calculation from thirtyfive years to thirty-eight years

•

Incorporating technical corrections in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) made by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics in 1995 and 1996 (which reduced the upward bias in measured inflation
by about 0.2 percentage point per year)

•

Investing 40 percent of trust-fund assets in corporate equities on a graduated basis
beginning in 2000

•

Redirecting of the share of revenues from the taxation of Social Security benefits that are
currently paid into the Medicare hospital insurance trust fund into the Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund (phasing in the change between 2010 and
2019)

•

Increasing the payroll tax by 0.8 percentage point on both employers and employees
starting in 2045

The Individual Accounts Proposal

Like the MB plans, the IA plan would make a variety of changes to balance the existing
program. In addition, the IA plan would create a system of supplementary required savings
accounts for all participants. Like the MB plan, the IA plan includes coverage of newly hired
state and local government employees, taxation of benefits that exceed contributions, and
incorporation of the CPI changes. In addition, the IA plan would raise the normal retirement age
to sixty-seven faster than under current law and index it to longevity thereafter. Finally, benefits
for middle- and upper-income recipients would be reduced by approximately 20 percent.
The mandatory savings portion of the IA plan would increase the employee’s payroll
contribution by 1.6 percentage points to fund government-administered individual accounts. Just
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as employees in the current federal government retirement program, participants would allocate
funds in their accounts to a relatively small number of government-managed index funds, which
would provide a variety of investment alternatives at low cost. At retirement, the savings would
be paid out as an annuity, with payouts adjusted for inflation, and added to the regular Social
Security benefit. Like any defined-contribution plan, retirement benefits would depend on the
returns achieved by the individual accounts.
The Personal Security Account Proposal
Of the three plans included in the Advisory Council’s report, the PSA plan calls for the most
dramatic change in the structure of the current system. The PSA plan would divert
five percentage points of the 12.4 percent payroll tax into mandatory accounts. Unlike the
individual savings accounts described above, which would be held by the government and
annuitized upon retirement, the PSA mandatory accounts could be managed by private
investment companies, and individuals would have broader choices over how the account
balance is paid out during retirement. The remaining 7.4 percentage points of the payroll tax
would pay for a flat retirement benefit for full-career workers equivalent to $410 a month in
1996 (and indexed for future wage growth beginning in 1998) and for reduced disability and
survivor benefits. The $410 flat benefit by itself would provide an income about one-third below
the poverty line for an elderly person living alone; the proceeds of the personal security accounts
would supplement the flat benefit.

The PSA plan would also reduce the financing gap through many of the same features as the MB
and IA proposals: It would expand coverage to newly hired state and local government workers,
alter the taxation of benefits, accelerate the increase in retirement age and index it to longevity
(as in the IA proposal), and incorporate adjustments made to the CPI.
This study highlights the major reform proposals of the time of issuance. There are many other
proposals being advanced, which while configured differently, use the same basic reform
concepts addressed in this study.

OTHER REFORM PLANS

The Feldstein-Samwick Personal Retirement Account Plan

In a series of papers, Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard and Professor Andrew Samwick of
Dartmouth present a plan for Social Security reform that gradually phases out the current system
and replaces it with an entirely new system of personal retirement accounts (PRAs).7 The new
PRAs would be privately managed, and there would be no requirement for benefits to be paid out
in annuities. Under this plan, all current retirees would receive current benefits without any
changes, and all benefits accrued by current workers up to this point would continue to be paid in

7 Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, “The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits”
(NBER Working Paper 6055, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997).

66

Exhibit 6.2

Estimated Changes in Long-Range Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
Actuarial Balance (Percent of Payroll) of Three Advisory Commission Plans
Proposal

MB*

IA**

PSA***

Assume Bureau of Labor Statistics adjustments will reduce cost of living adjustments by 0.21%
by Dec. 1997.

0.31

0.31

0.31

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.28

0.28
0.17
1.32

Adjust Cost of Living Adjustments

Increase Coverage
Cover all state and local government employees hired after 1997.

Reduce Benefits
Benefit computation years to 36 (1997), 37 (1998), and 38 (1998 forward), effective by eligibility.
Reduce aged spouse benefit from 50% to 33%, ratably from 2000 to 2016.
For 1998-2011, reduce the 0.32 and 0.15 factors in the primary insurance amount (PIA) formula
by 0.5% (multiply by 0.995). For 2012-2030, by 1.5% (multiply by 0.985). After 2030, factors are
0.224 and 0.105.
Gradually replace the current PIA formula with a basic flat benefit ($410 in 1996, wage-indexed
thereafter), for workers under 55 in 1998. Provide past service credits for workers 25 to 54 in
1998. Disability and young survivor beneficiaries retain current PIA formula. Aged spouses get
50% of the full flat benefit.
Gradually redirect revenue from benefit taxation that is transferred to the Hospital Insurance trust
fund to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance trust funds, with 10%
redirected in 2010, 20% in 2011,.... and 100% redirected in 2019 and later.

3.82

0.26

Increase Retirement Age(s)
0.50

Increase the normal retirement age (NRA) by 2 months per year for 2000 to 2011, reaching NRA
of 67. Index NRA thereafter to increases in life expectancy (by about 1 month every 2 years).
Increase the NRA and early retirement age (ERA) by 2 months per year from 2000 to 2011. Index
thereafter (limit ERA to 65). Reduce disabled worker benefits, eventually to 70% of PIA.

1.25

Tax Benefits
Tax OASDI benefits like pension benefits, but with $25,000/32,000 thresholds.
Phase out the $25,000/32,000 tax thresholds of benefits between 1998 and 2007.
Eliminate the earnings test at the NRA.

0.15
0.16

0.15
0.16

0.16

1

Increase Surviving-Spouse Benefits
-0.32

Increase surviving spouse benefit to highest of own PIA, spouse’s PIA, and 75% of combined
benefits if both were still alive, phased in over 1998 to 2037.
Gradually replace the current surviving spouse benefit with the highest of own PIA, spouse’s PIA,
and 75% of combined benefits if both were still alive, phased in over 1998 to 2037.

-0.39

Increase Payroll Taxes
Increase payroll tax rate in 2045 by 0.8% for employees and employers, each.
Increase the payroll tax by 0.76% for employees and employers, each for 1998 to 2069 (or
equivalent tax of another form).

0.22
1.42

Borrow From Treasury

1

Borrow additional funds from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury in years 2002 to about 2034,
pay back with interest by 2070.
Equity Investment And Individual Accounts

Invest a portion of trust funds assets in stocks for 2015 and thereafter.
Starting 1998, require contribution equal to 1.6% of earnings to an individual account (in addition
to current tax). Proceeds from the accounts would not be taxed.
Redirect 5 percentage points of the OASDI employee payroll tax to personal security accounts for
workers under 55 in 1998. Proceeds from the accounts are not taxed.

0.82

-4.60

Total

2.42

2.57

2.18

Estimated long-range OASDI actuarial balance

0.24

0.40

0.01

* Maintenance of Benefits; ** Individual Accounts; *** Personal Security Accounts
1 Based on the intermediate assumptions of the 1995 Annual Trustees Report.

Source: Office of the Actuary, Social Security Administration (October 1996).
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the future. The current payroll tax of 12.4 percent would be gradually ratcheted down as each
cohort of retirees were due fewer benefits under the current system.

Because the new PRAs expect to earn a rate of return of more than 9 percent on their equity
investments, and because increased receipts of federal and state corporate income taxes due to
higher economic growth would be channeled into the new system, the contributions to personal
service accounts of only 2.1 percent of payroll are estimated to provide the same benefits as
currently financed by the 12.4 percent payroll tax rate.
Thus, in the first year this plan is implemented, workers would pay a combined tax rate of
14.5 percent, but after twenty years the combined rate would drop below the current rate of
12.4 percent. Thereafter, the decline in the tax rate would be relatively rapid until the combined
tax rate falls to 2.1 percent after seventy-five years, when the system would consist entirely of
personal retirement accounts.

The Moynihan Social Security Solvency Act of 1998
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan announced his own proposal for Social Security reform in
March of 1998. His plan would eliminate current surpluses and return Social Security to a payas-you-go system. Payroll tax rates would be cut from 12.4 percent to 10.4 percent between 2001
and 2024, and the rate would stay at or below 12.4 percent until 2045. Even in years beyond
2045, the pay-as-you-go rates under the plan would increase only slightly above the current rate
of 12.4 percent. Rates would reach 13.4 percent in 2060. At the same time, the proposal would
permit voluntary personal savings accounts, which workers could finance with the proceeds of
the two-percentage-point cut in the payroll tax. Alternatively, a worker could simply take the
employee share of the tax cut in the form of an increase in take-home pay equal to one
percentage point of wages.

In addition to modest tax increases in the long run, the Moynihan plan would reduce the Social
Security deficit though a variety of mechanisms: An increase in the maximum amount of annual
wages subject to Social Security payroll tax (currently $68,400) to $97,500 by 2003; a
one-percentage-point downward correction in cost of living adjustments; a gradual increase in
the retirement age to sixty-eight in 2017 and to seventy in 2065; taxation of Social Security
benefits in a manner similar to the taxation of private pensions; extension of Social Security
coverage to newly hired employees in currently excluded state and local government positions;
and, reduction of benefits on average by about 3 percent by increasing the length of the
computation period from thirty-five to thirty-eight years. In addition, the plan would eliminate
the earnings test for all beneficiaries over the age of sixty-two.
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
On May 19, 1998, the National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP), a bipartisan
commission comprised of leaders from the Congress and the private sector, released its proposal
to modernize the Social Security system. The NCRP plan would raise the normal retirement age
to seventy by 2029, early retirement age to sixty-five by 2017, and index both after 2029. It
would require all state and local employees hired after 1999 to participate in Social Security.
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Benefits payable to spouse beneficiaries would be reduced from 50 percent to 33 percent, phased
in from 2000 to 2016. The earnings test would be eliminated, and the method of calculating
benefits would be adjusted to count all years of earnings in the numerator of average indexed
monthly earnings. In addition, the plan would credit all revenue generated from the taxation of
benefits to the Social Security trust funds. The plan would also provide for a minimum benefit,
as a function of the poverty level, based on the number of years the individual has worked.
Although the overall payroll tax rate, currently at 12.4 percent, would not change, for those
employees under age fifty-five, two percentage points would be diverted from the Social
Security trust fund and directed into individual savings accounts.
The plan also recommends retirement savings reforms. It creates a single, universal salary
reduction plan in 401(k) and a universal income limit for IRAs. The plan also provides workers
the ability to move retirement benefits among employer-sponsored plans, and it reduces the time
it takes for the employers’ matching contributions to vest.

CONCLUSION: POLICY TRADE-OFFS
The myriad of factors to take into consideration in evaluating Social Security and the proposals
to reform it can be an overwhelming task. Competing policy goals must be considered, such as
improving the condition of the fund, giving taxpayers their money’s worth through an acceptable
rate of return, providing a desirable degree of redistribution to low-income individuals,
generating a favorable impact on saving, and promoting a favorable impact on labor supply. The
three major approaches to reform (reducing benefits, increasing revenues, and improving the rate
of return on assets) provide differing results to these policy goals. Exhibit 6.3 summarizes some
of the possible effects of various types of proposals.
Exhibit 6.3
Summary Evaluation of Options for Reform
Soundness:
Improves
Condition of
Fund?

Money’s Worth:
Poverty:
Growth:
Growth:
Degree of
Probable
Impact on
Average Rate of Redistribution to Probable Impact Impact on Labor
on Saving?
Low Incomes?
Supply?
Return?

1. Reduce benefits

A. Across the board

Yes

Reduces

Less

More

More

B. Only for high-wage workers

Yes

Reduces

More

More

More

C. Increase retirement age

Yes

Reduces

Depends

More

More

A. Raise payroll tax rate

Yes

Reduces

Depends

More

Less

B. Raise ceiling on taxable
earnings

Yes

Reduces

More

More

Less

Yes

Increases

No effect

No effect

No effect

No effect

Increases

Less

Increases

More

II. Increase revenue

III. Improve return on assets

A. Invest trust fund in equities
B. Individual accounts
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